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1. INTRODUCTION
Following the Arab Spring protests in the Middle East and North
Africa that spread in 2011, the completion of new constitutions became a hallmark of the political transitions in those countries—
Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen—where authoritarian leaders
were toppled. The Arab Spring uprisings began in late December
2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi, a fruit vendor in Tunisia set himself
on fire to protest his mistreatment by Tunisian authorities.1 His action was a flashpoint for longstanding grievances that people within
the Middle East and North African (MENA) region held against
their governments. In response, protests spread throughout the
MENA region. Protesters demanded the removal of authoritarian
regimes and economic, democratic, and human rights reforms.2 The
protests led to the toppling of authoritarian leaders in Egypt and
Tunisia. As part of their political transitions, Egypt and Tunisia
completed new constitutions in 2014, refining their internal social
compacts between the citizen and the state. The constitution-making processes unfolded in each country quite differently. In Tunisia,
the constitutional re-calibration was broadly participatory and
transparent which augured well for constitutional legitimacy and
democratic advance, whereas in Egypt the re-calibration was exclusive and closed, risking illegitimacy and a continued lack of accountability for state actors.3 In Libya and Yemen, the political transitions

1
Marc Fisher, In Tunisia, Act of One Fruit Vendor Sparks Wave of Revolution
Through Arab World, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-tunisia-act-of-one-fruit-vendor-sparks-wave-of-revolution-through-arab-world/2011/03/16/AFjfsueB_story.html
[https://perma.cc/M5XT-JGW9].
2 For an overview of the Arab Spring protests, see generally Katerina
Dalacoura, The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical
Implications, 88 INT’L AFF. 63 (2012).
3 See generally Darin E.W. Johnson, Beyond Constituent Assemblies and Referenda:
Assessing the Legitimacy of the Arab Spring Constitutions in Egypt and Tunisia, 50 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1007 (2015) (highlighting the differences in constitution-making processes resulting from the Arab Spring between Egypt and Tunisia).
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heralded by the Arab Spring devolved into civil wars that are ongoing at the time of writing of this article.4 These civil wars have resulted in over 5,800 deaths5 in Libya and over 10,000 deaths6 in
Yemen. As a consequence of these devastating civil wars, constitutional reform processes which were intended to cement political
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy were instead held
hostage by the armed perpetrators of the protracted civil conflicts.
As the political transitions in Libya and Yemen devolved into civil
war, the constitution-making processes also devolved into conflict
over the same outcomes that armed elites sought on the battlefield
by force. These armed actors discovered a new battlefront in Yemen
and Libya’s constituent debates.
Comparative constitutional scholarship has emphasized the importance of participatory constitution-making as a post-conflict tool
for political transition. However, ongoing violent conflict frustrates
open, transparent, inclusive and participatory processes—the hallmarks of participatory constitution-making.7 The violent intensity
of the civil conflicts in Yemen and Libya undermined the conciliatory objectives of participatory constitution-making in both countries. The undermining of conciliatory processes, in turn, imperiled
the creation of consensus constitutional texts and risked the creation
of “conflict constitutions” that would prolong, rather than remedy,
the sources of conflict.

4
The “civil wars” in Libya and Yemen began after the NATO intervention
supporting the Libyan opposition’s ouster of Mohamed Qadaffi in Libya, and after
the UN and US-brokered departure of President Hadi in Yemen. Although civil
conflict occurred immediately following the Arab Spring uprisings in both countries, the “civil wars” discussed in this piece began in 2014 when dual governments
in each country arose, violently clashing with one another and claiming authority
in the wake of the initial Arab Spring political transitions. The civil wars are discussed in detail in Parts III and IV.
5
Violent Deaths in 2014, 2015, and 2016 Libya Body Count, SQUARE SPACE (Feb.
24,
2017,
7:00
PM),
http://www.libyabodycount.org/table
[https://perma.cc/63X7-SZBA].
6 Mohammed Ghobari, At Least 10,000 Killed in Yemen Civil War, REUTERS (Aug.
30, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-toll/u-n-says10000-killed-in-yemen-war-far-more-than-other-estimates-idUSKCN11516W
[https://perma.cc/3RX2-ASRE] (quoting U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator Jamie
McGoldrick’s reporting of U.N.-acquired information from medical facilities in
Yemen).
7 See Vivien Hart, Constitution-Making and the Transformation of Conflict, 26 PEACE & CHANGE 153 (2001) (examining the constitution-making process
and its contribution to the transformation of conflicts).
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The impact of violent civil conflict on concurrent constitutionmaking processes and the constitutions that they produce has been
under-examined in comparative constitutional scholarship and this
article seeks to fill that gap. In this article, I develop a conceptual
theory of “conflict constitution-making” that assesses the impact of
civil war on constitution-making processes and the resultant constitutions, and I apply that theory to the events in Libya and Yemen.
My theory of conflict constitution-making draws from comparative
constitutional scholarship and posits that civil war transforms constitution-making processes from zones of conciliation into zones of
conflict. During civil war, unless a political détente can be reached
that commits armed actors to a consensual and participatory constitution-making process, armed power brokers exploit the process
and drive constitution-makers away from accommodation and into
conflict. Such a conflict constitution-making process produces a
“conflict constitution” that enshrines rather than ameliorates the
sources of conflict.
An exploration of the impact of violent civil conflict on constitution-making is critical because, although best practice calls for the
creation of a constitution only after the cessation of hostilities, political transitions are often fluid and constitution-making processes
undertaken during periods of relative peace may continue during
periods of extreme violence (as seen in Libya and Yemen, discussed
infra). A better understanding of the impact of violence on constitution-making processes will better enable citizens, scholars and practitioners to assess, and if necessary, reform those processes as well
as the constitutions created by them. While participatory constitution-making is the aspirational ideal, conflict constitution-making
may increasingly become the reality in transitioning states. Accordingly, an understanding of how to best remedy a “conflict constitution-making” process is one of the goals of this piece.
In examining the events of Libya and Yemen, I conclude that
during violent civil war, unless a political agreement is achieved that
commits armed actors to a consensual constitution-making process,
armed actors will exploit existing constitution-making processes for
their own ends, increasing the likelihood that provisions of the resulting constitution will contribute to the persistence rather than the
resolution of the underlying conflicts. In Libya, constitution-making
processes were stymied by internal conflict but a United Nations
(“UN”)-brokered political agreement created renewed space for
armed actors to support the constituent assembly and a unified state
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under the new constitution. In Yemen, the National Dialogue’s failure to achieve political consensus with powerful factions on fundamental issues catalyzed a civil war that undermined the work of
constitutional drafters and threatened the long-term viability of the
draft constitution. These conflict processes led to draft constitutions
that were not accepted by major constituencies in both countries.
For the constitutions to contribute to societal cohesion, rather than
conflict, peace must be brokered outside of the constitution-making
process, and remedial measures must be undertaken to increase
broad public engagement and support for the constitutions. Further, the constitutional texts themselves must be modified to include
measures that support multiethnic and moderate political representation that can sustain peace over time and prevent relapses into
civil war.
Section 2 of the Article provides an overview of approaches to
constitution-making in transitioning countries and defines my theory of conflict constitution-making. Section 3 assesses the constitution-making process in Libya in light of this theory of conflict constitution-making. Section 4 assesses the conflict constitutionmaking process in Yemen. Section 5 discusses constitutional design
options for addressing the sectarian and regional divisions that
drive intrastate conflict. Section 6 examines the features of the draft
constitutions created in Libya and Yemen considering these design
options. Section 7 offers recommendations on how the constitutionmaking processes and draft constitutions in Libya and Yemen can
be modified to mitigate future conflict. Section 8 concludes.
2. CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN TRANSITIONING STATES
Constitutions are foundational documents that seek to define the
social compact between the state and the citizen. Accordingly, constitutional reform in transitioning states frequently signals a transition from authoritarianism to democracy, colonialism to independence, or from conflict to peace. Constitution-making during periods
of political transition, brought on by political revolution or civil conflict has been referred to as transitional constitutionalism or transitional constitution-making.8 Transitional constitution-making seeks
8
Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L. J. 2009, 2052 (1997).
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to define state powers and citizen rights, create a national polity and
bolster state stability in states where conflict and division have prevented the effective accomplishment of those goals. Much of the
scholarship on modern constitution-making during periods of transition has emphasized the importance of a participatory constitution-making process, which involves wide-spread public participation and transparency, as the most effective tool for ensuring
legitimate and effective constitutional reform in transitioning
states.9 Transitional constitution-making has been undertaken in a
wide range of circumstances, from political revolutions brought on
by non-violent protests, to transitions following long-term civil
wars, to transitions brought on by military intervention and foreign
occupation.10 Constitutional scholars and practitioners have advocated for participatory constitution-making because it can aid in
constitutional legitimacy and effectiveness in transitioning states.
However, the hallmarks of participatory constitution-making—
open, transparent, public, and inclusive processes—are constrained
by violent civil war. In the most extreme instances, civil war can
make constitution-making processes another site of battle, where
armed actors exploit constitution-making processes to further their
aims. When this occurs, the constitution-making process is transformed into a “conflict constitution-making” process more likely to
exacerbate rather than reconcile conflict. The attributes of participatory and conflict constitution-making are examined below.
2.1. Participatory Constitution-Making
Participatory constitution-making describes a set of transparent
and inclusive drafting processes that have been utilized in post-conflict or transitioning states to ensure broad societal acceptance of a
new regime or constitutional order that follows a political revolution
or the resolution of a civil conflict.11 Since the late twentieth century,

9
Hart, supra note 7; Kirsti Samuels, Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 663, 663–64 (2006).
10 Examples of the different circumstances under which transitional constitution-making can occur include Tunisia (non-violent political revolution), South Africa (long-term civil war), and Iraq (military intervention and foreign occupation).
11
See Hart, supra note 7 (describing the importance of constitutions and the
process of constitution-making to completing the establishment of a new political
order).
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constitution-making following conflict has trended towards greater
transparency, citizen engagement, and inclusivity.12 Such participatory constitution-making encourages the inclusive “participation”
of a diverse citizenry in the process.13 Scholars have advocated for
participatory constitution-making in post-conflict and transitioning
states in order to resolve long-standing disputes by fostering consensus among a diverse array of groups on national principles and
by addressing the concerns of previously marginalized citizens.14
For example, participatory constitution-making was successfully
utilized in Tunisia following the Arab Spring and in South Africa
following decades-long civil strife between minority groups and the
apartheid government.15 These participatory constitution-making
processes were largely viewed as legitimate because they were deliberative, transparent, occurred in phases, and provided opportunity for public feedback, participation, and acceptance (either directly or through elected representatives) among a diverse array of
citizens with divergent racial, religious, and ideological backgrounds.16 Participatory processes have frequently been “post-conflict” tools that have followed or been concomitant with the resolution of a political revolution or violent civil conflict. This approach
follows best practice which calls for a cessation of hostilities and political settlement prior to the initiation of an effective participatory
constitution-making process.17
12
For example, transition leaders in an array of countries, including Kenya,
Uganda, Brazil, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, and South Africa have utilized participatory constitution-making processes. Jason Gluck & Michele Brandt, U.S. Institute for Peace, Participatory and Inclusive Constitution Making: Giving Voice to the
Demands of Citizens in the Wake of the Arab Spring, 105 PEACEWORKS 5, 5-6 (2015),
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW105-Participatory-and-InclusiveConstitution-Making.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ6G-NZVT].
13 Angela M. Banks, Expanding Participation in Constitution Making: Challenges
and Opportunities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1043–1048 (2008).
14 Id. at 1046–1048; Hart, supra note 7, at 154; Gluck & Brandt, supra note 12, at
5–6.
15 See generally Johnson, supra note 3 (discussing the constitution-making processes in conflicted regions); Ziyad Motala, Constitution-Making in Divided Societies
and Legitimacy: Lessons from the South African Experience, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 147 (2005) (using South Africa as an example of successful participatory constitution-making).
16 Id.
17 Samuels, supra note 9, at 664. (“It is widely acknowledged that the provision
of security is the sine qua non of peace-building, and increasingly that the building
or rebuilding of public institutions is key to sustainability; however, the fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must form the core of
any post-conflict peace-building mission . . .. Constitution-making after conflict is
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Because constitutional reform is an opportunity for warring parties to break with the status quo and to develop new political and
governance arrangements, warring parties have often agreed to constitutional reform as a key condition of the cessation of hostilities.18
Therefore, the promise of constitutional reform is often an effective
peacemaking tool. However, comprehensive participatory constitution-making processes may be impossible in countries experiencing
ongoing hostilities and violent civil conflict. For example, the initial
constitution-making processes undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan
during the U.S. led military interventions and occupations, or in the
creation of South Sudan were limited in their scope by the ongoing
violent conflict and could hardly be articulated as broadly participatory. Nevertheless, these constitution-making processes were initiated because they served an important role in helping to move the
respective countries’ political transitions forward. In the extreme
circumstance of ongoing violent civil war with competing governments, such as in Libya and Yemen, the pursuit of constitution-making not only frustrates consensus-building with diverse constituencies, it fosters further conflict.19
2.2. Conflict Constitution-Making
When constitution-making occurs during active violent civil
conflict, many of the goals of participatory constitution-making processes are frustrated. Participatory constitution-making encourages
deliberative negotiation and public participation in state creation
and institutional design, but constitution-makers are unable to pursue these goals when the security environment does not permit
widespread public engagement. Further, politically aligned armed
actors can use violent civil conflict to manipulate constitution-making processes. Conflict constitution-making occurs when warring
belligerents that seek to achieve political objectives through armed
force co-opt ongoing constitution-making processes to achieve their
political ends under the threat of force. These armed actors effectively transform the constitution-making process into another site of
an opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map
on how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace agreement and partly a
framework setting up the rules by which the new democracy will operate.”).
18 Id.
19 Discussed infra in Sections 3 and 4.
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battle. The markers of a conflict constitution-making process are (1)
extreme conflict amongst constitutional drafters that mirror the positions of warring belligerents, (2) an inability of drafters to reach
consensus on these political issues, and (3) boycott and rejection of
non-consensual constituent assembly choices by major blocs. The
incorporation of these conflicts into constitutional texts risks the creation of “conflict constitutions” with embedded conflicts, rather
than embedded consensus solutions. The danger of conflict constitution-making is that it exacerbates and prolongs rather than reduces societal divisions.
A conflict constitution-making process must be rehabilitated in
order to serve as an effective tool for peace and reconciliation. In
states enmeshed in civil war, a cease fire or peace agreement is frequently the prerequisite for a constitution-making process.20 A
cease fire or peace agreement is intended to halt violent conflict and
to create an environment in which warring factions can negotiate
longer term political arrangements, including constitutional reform.21 The cease fire itself can provide for power distribution arrangements between warring factions that ultimately are transferred into constitution-making processes.22 In order to rehabilitate
an ongoing conflict constitution-making process, a peacemaking
mechanism can be incorporated into the constitution-making process. The peacemaking mechanism should result in a peace agreement that addresses the sources of conflict between warring parties
and commits the parties to support a consensus based constitutionmaking process free of violent influence. Such an agreement creates
space for the incorporation of consensus based solutions into the

20
Sujit Choudhry, Civil War, Cease Fire, Constitution: Some Preliminary Notes,
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1915 (2012).
21 Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, 100 AM. J. INT’L
L. 373, 377 (2006). Ceasefires and peace agreements may take different forms but
they prioritize the cessation of active hostilities and may include de-militarization
measures such as de-armament, de-mobilization, and armed forces integration, as
well as political measures addressing governance, elections, accountability, and institution building. Id.
22
Choudhry, supra note 20, at 1917. In turn, the maintenance of sustained
peace between parties in conflict is furthered through constitution-making processes that build long term institutions that contribute to stability. In transitional
constitution-making, it is not unusual for the creation of a constitution to be considered part of the peace agreement – or in some instances for the constitution to be
viewed as a de-facto peace agreement. Cf. Hallie Ludsin, Peacemaking and Constitution-Drafting: A Dysfunctional Marriage, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 239 (2011) (questioning
whether constitution-making should also be used for peacemaking).
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constitution and reduces the likelihood that a conflict constitution
will be created that exacerbates societal divisions.
Parts 3 and 4 assess the impact of violent civil war upon the constitution-making processes in Libya and Yemen.
3. CIVIL WAR AND CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN LIBYA
The transition governments in Libya and Yemen each initiated
constitution-making processes before the countries devolved into
civil war. The declining security environment in each country prevented broad-based, inclusive participatory constitution-making.
Warring political blocs began to press for their political aims within
constitution-making bodies. The constitution-making processes
themselves were inappropriate fora for much needed peacemaking,
as they did not allow for timely political negotiation and bargaining
among key stakeholders.23 External internationally backed peace
negotiations became necessary to open space for meaningful constitutional reform. In Libya, a UN peace agreement facilitated the completion of a constitution backed by a new unity government. In
Yemen, discussed infra Section 4, the completion of a nonconsensual
constitution fomented a new more divisive phase of the civil war.
3.1. Pre-Arab Spring Libya
The civil war that followed the Arab Spring was the result of
decades-long regional and sectarian divisions extending back to
Libya’s formation. Libya has historically been a federal state comprised of three regions—Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan. Each
region was occupied by Italy early in the twentieth century and in
1929, Italy began to administer the entire area under one governor.24
Following Italy’s defeat in World War II, French forces took control

23
Jason Gluck, Constitution-Building in a Political Vacuum: Libya and Yemen in
2014, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE 43, 44 (2015),
http://www.idea.int/publications/annual-review-of-cbp-2014/upload/annualreview-of-cbp-2014-c2.pdf [https://perma.cc/996F-5GAC].
24
NADINE SCHNELZER, LIBYA IN THE ARAB SPRING: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DISCOURSE SINCE THE FALL OF GADDAFI 1, 31 (Springer VS, 2016).
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of Fezzan, and the British occupied Cyrenaica and Tripolitania.25 In
1951, Libya was declared independent by the United Nations.26 The
post-independence 1951 Constitution established the United Kingdom of Libya as a hereditary monarchy with a federal, partly representative form of government.27 In 1963, the Libyan Kingdom was
divided into ten governorates and federal provisions were removed
from the Constitution.28 In 1969, Qaddafi led a military coup against
the king, took control of the country, and abolished the 1951 Constitution.29 Qaddafi issued a 1969 Constitutional Proclamation that established his Revolutionary Command Council as the supreme authority in the Libyan Arab Republic.30 In 1975, Qaddafi issued the
Green Book which provided his political philosophy for the organization of the “Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” his
term for the Libyan state.31 The Green Book was not a constitution,
as it did not create state institutions nor define their authorities, nor
define the rights of the Libyan people in relation to the state—instead it laid out the philosophical underpinnings of Qaddafi’s view
of government.32 Qaddafi manipulated historic regional and tribal
divisions and the lack of state institutions and enforceable individual rights to maintain his authoritarian grip on power.33 The people
25 See Al Arabiya, Libya’s Historic Divisions Foreshadow Political Complexities in
Post-Qaddafi Era, AL ARABIYA NEWS (Mar. 8, 2012, 1:53 PM), https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/08/199397.html [https://perma.cc/M2UHP2LV] (revisiting the history of Libya’s different regions to better understand possible political conflicts and expected separatist movements).
26
See Country Guide: LIBYA, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/libya.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/7SW4-KMMX] (summarizing Libya’s land and people, economy, government, and history).
27
Jorg Fedtke, Eur. Union, Comp. Analysis Between the Situations in Egypt and
Tunis.—Lessons Learnt—Overview of the Const. Situation in Libya, 22 (Apr. 2014),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2014/433840/EXPO-AFET_NT(2014)433840_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A3YP-WPFU].
28 Id.
29
INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, THE DRAFT LIBYAN CONSTITUTION: PROCEDURAL
DEFICIENCIES, SUBSTANTIVE FLAWS 15 (2015), https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Libya-Draft-Constitution-Flaws-Deficiencies-Publications-Reports-2015-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TA9-FFNY].
30 Fedtke, supra note 27, at 22.
31 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 15.
32 Id.
33 E.g., Jackson N. Maogoto & Andrew Coleman, Changing the Guard–The Price
of Democracy: Lessons from the Arab Spring on Constitutionalism, in THE ARAB SPRING:
NEW PATTERNS FOR DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 11-12 (Carlo Panara &
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of Libya existed without clear constitutional rights or proper state
institutions for the duration of Qaddafi’s 42-year regime, which
ended with the Arab Spring Libyan revolution of 2011.
3.2. 2011 Constitutional Declaration
On August 3, 2011, two months before Qaddafi was killed by the
military arm of the National Transitional Council (“NTC”)34, a leadership body for the coalition of rebels, opposition activists, and expatriates that had come together to militarily defeat the Qaddafi regime, the NTC issued a Constitutional Declaration (“Interim
Constitution”).35 The Interim Constitution defined the NTC and interim government’s authorities during a twenty-month transition
process that would culminate with the election of a new president
and legislature in early 2013. Elections for a new parliament, known
as the General National Congress (“GNC”) were scheduled for July
7, 2012. Upon the GNC’s election, the NTC would dissolve and pass
its authority to the GNC, which would then appoint the new interim
government.36 The GNC would serve as a temporary legislative
body until a Constitutional Drafting Assembly (“CDA”) completed
a new constitution defining the authorities of the new parliament
and president.37

Gary Wilson eds., 2013) (describing Qaddafi’s dismantlement of state institutions
to consolidate his power).
34 See S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4 (Mar. 17, 2011) (authorizing an international coalition
of military forces to use military force against Qaddafi and his forces in protection
of Libyan civilians).
35
See THE CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION Aug. 3, 2011 (Libya) (declaring the
collapse of Qaddafi’s regime).
36 See id., art. 30 (“The Interim Transitional National Council shall be dissolved
upon holding the first meeting of the National Public Conference.”).
37
See id. (“The National Public Conference shall ratify and announce the results of the elections, and shall convoke the Legislative Authority for meeting
within a period not exceeding thirty days. In the first session thereof, the National
Public Conference shall be dissolved and the Legislative Power shall fulfill its legislative tasks.”).
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3.3. Beginnings of Constitutional Conflict – CDA Formation
After Qaddafi’s defeat, fissures in the opposition coalition became apparent. Various groups began to oppose the NTC’s plans
for constitutional reform. Libyans from less-populous regions, minority groups, and women all expressed concern about their
planned representation within the CDA. Under the Interim Constitution, the NTC tasked the GNC with selecting the sixty CDA members that would draft the new Constitution.38 On the eve of the July
2012 elections for the GNC, the NTC made a concession to the less
populous Tripolitania and Fezzan regions whose citizens threatened
to boycott the GNC elections out of fear that the GNC would not
adequately represent their regions when appointing members to the
CDA. The NTC amended the Interim Constitution so that the CDA
would be elected directly by voters instead of appointed by the
GNC.39 The amendment also determined that twenty members of
the constituent assembly would come from each of Libya’s three historic regions—Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan.40 The formula
was modeled after the sixty-member constituent assembly that created the post-independence 1951 Libyan Constitution.41 The concession reflected one of the enduring conflicts in post-Qaddafi Libya,
determining who would have a seat at the table for determining how
power would be allocated in the new Libyan state.

38
See CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION amend. No. 1-2012 (Libya) (“The CDA
shall be composed of sixty members after the model of the Committee of Sixty,
which was established to draft the constitution of Libya’s independence in 1951”);
see also Fedtke, supra note 27, at 22 (“The 2011 Constitutional Declaration itself, finally, sets out a basic system of government . . . but was not intended to provide
more than the most essential transitional arrangements for a limited period of
time.”).
39 See CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION amend. No. 3-2012, art. 1 (Libya) (“Elect
a constituent assembly of a non-GNC members by direct free vote to draft the country’s permanent constitution, to be called the Constitutional Drafting Assembly
(CDA)”); see also CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION amend. No. 5-2013 (Libya) (repromulgating the election of the CDA by direct free ballot as the result of a court
decision); see also INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 15 (“The requirement
for the CDA to be elected was initially provided for by Constitutional Amendment
No. 3, but later replaced by Constitutional Amendment No. 5 following a Supreme
Court ruling that Constitutional Amendment 3 had not been legally promulgated.”).
40 See Fedtke, supra note 27, at 20 (“Seats for the GNC were distributed nationally on the basis of population numbers . . ..”).
41 Id.
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Following these amendments to the Interim Constitution, the
GNC was elected in July 2012. The GNC contained sixty members
from Cyrenaica in Eastern Libya, 100 members from Tripolitania in
Western Libya, and forty members from Fezzan in southern Libya.42
This representation mirrored the population of the country:30% in
Cyrenaica, 60% in Tripolitania, and 10% in Fezzan.43
Another conflict surrounding CDA formation concerned the
scope of minority and female representation in the CDA. The
Amazigh, Touareg, and Tebu minority groups expressed concern
that they would not obtain adequate representation within the
CDA.44 The Amazigh had been among the groups that were early
opponents of Qaddafi because Qaddafi’s brand of Arab nationalism
had long oppressed their cultural and linguistic expression.45 The
minority groups wanted to ensure that they had consequential voting power within the CDA and thus pushed for a voting framework
that required that any decision involving minority rights must have
their agreement.46 Similar concerns were expressed about the scope
of female representation. The head of the GNC Human Rights Committee noted that the committee advocated for a 35% representation
of women in the CDA.47 A 2013 law enacted by the GNC reserved
10% of the CDA seats (six) for women and two seats each for the
Amazigh, Touareg, and Tebu.48 The Amazigh, who consisted of
nearly 10% of the Libyan population, were dissatisfied with the two
seats that they were allocated.49 They were also dissatisfied with the

42
See id. (“The TNC was dissolved with the election of the General National
Congress on 7 July 2012 . . . [giving] districts in Tripolitania (western Libya) 100
seats, districts in Cyrenaica (eastern Libya) 60 seats, and districts in Fezzan (southern Libya) 40 seats.”).
43
See id. (“The three parts of the country account for roughly 60, 30, and 10
percent of the population respectively.”)
44 See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 16 (detailing the controversy
arising over sufficient representation of minorities).
45 The Amazigh are also known as the Berbers.
46 Fedtke, supra note 27, at 21.
47 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 16.
48 See Law Number 7 of 2013 (Libya); see also Fedtke, supra note 27, at 20 (describing how the law attempted to secure representation of women and ethnic
groups).
49 See Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya’s Draft Constitution: Compromise or Compromised?,
ATLANTIC
COUNCIL
(Mar.
3,
2016),
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/libya-s-draft-constitution-compromise-or-compromised [https://perma.cc/FB85-MTDK] (discussing how based on proportional
representation the Amazigh should have been allocated six seats).
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voting framework adopted for the CDA, which was a two-thirds
plus one majority—a framework which would require coordination
across regions but which could still result in minority groups being
overruled on issues.50 The Amazigh found the GNC’s attempt to
ameliorate their concerns by (1) naming the minority groups “cultural and linguistic” components of Libyan society, and (2) alluding
that CDA members should reach an agreement with minorities on
the issues of concern, to be unsatisfactory.51 Ultimately, the
Amazigh boycotted the CDA election and its work.52 The Touareg
and Tebu minorities, which received two seats each, soon followed
the Amazigh into a boycott of the body. The boycott arose out of
minority group members’ belief that the CDA was not operating in
a consensus-based manner, as called for by the Constitutional Declaration.53
The CDA was elected by national referendum in February
2014.54 Six hundred forty-nine candidates ran for the CDA, including sixty-five women.55 Two rounds of voting were held on February 20 and February 26 because of violence at eighty polling stations
on the first day of voting.56 Ongoing violence prevented successive
polling at several stations, resulting in thirteen seats on the CDA remaining unfilled initially.57 Although the Amazigh, Touareg, and
Tebu minorities initially boycotted the CDA, two months after the
CDA began its work, the Touareg and Tebu representatives joined
the assembly.58 Ultimately all but four seats on the CDA were filled.
The unfilled seats belonged to the boycotting Amazigh community
Gluck, supra note 23, at 46.
See CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION amend. No. 7-2014, art. 1 (Libya) (“taking
into account the distinct linguistic and cultural components of Libyan society
(Amazigh—Tuareg—Tubu)”); see also INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 16
(describing how the Amazigh still decided to boycott the elections and constitutional drafting process even after the GNC adopted Constitutional Amendment No.
7).
52
See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 16 (commenting how the
Amazigh boycotted the elections and continued to boycott the constitutional drafting).
53 See St. John, supra note 49 (detailing the boycott after the GNC ignored demands for official recognition of Amazigh language, cultural identity, and contribution to Libyan history).
54 Fedtke, supra note 27, at 20-21.
55 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 16.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
50
51

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

310

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 39:2

and representatives of the Derna community, unable to attend the
CDA due to ongoing violence.59
The CDA produced its first draft proposals in December 2014
and its first draft constitution in October 2015.60 A revised draft was
released in February 2016 and a final draft was adopted in April
2016.
3.4. Civil Conflict
Two months after the CDA held its first meeting in April 2014,
parliamentary elections were held. Two-thousand candidates competed for seats in Libya’s new House of Representatives.61 On June
26, 2014, about 630,000 people, less than half of the 1.5 million Libyans who had registered to vote, showed up at the polls.62 This number was a fraction of the 2.8 million Libyans who had registered to
vote for the GNC in 2012.63 The low voter turnout was caused by
ongoing violence between government security forces and militias
that had broken out after Qaddafi’s removal, and the fracturing of
some members of the opposition coalition that had joined forces to
topple him. Five people were killed in the fighting that broke out
between Islamist militias and government security forces in Benghazi.64 Human rights activist, lawyer, and former NTC member
Salwa Bughaighis was shot dead at her home in Benghazi shortly
after returning from voting.65 Benghazi became a flashpoint for
fighting between Islamist militias and the government, as dramatically demonstrated by the death of U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens
during a militia attack on a U.S. compound in Benghazi on September 11, 2012.
The elections for the House of Representatives were called by
the transition government out of fear that Libyan National Army

Id.
Id. at 4 (providing a timeline of the constitutional drafting process).
61
Libyan Elections: Low Turnout Marks Bid to End Political Crisis, BBC NEWS
(June
26,
2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28005801
[https://perma.cc/H66K-VRNJ].
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
59
60
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General Khalifah Haftar was plotting a coup.66 Haftar denied the
allegations, but still embarked on a military campaign called “Operation Dignity” against Islamist militias that he believed were holding Libya hostage to violence.67 The Islamist coalition that he fought
included Ansar al-Sharia, the group accused of killing Ambassador
Stevens.68 The government and militia fighting led to seventy
deaths and the storming of the GNC by armed men.69 The House of
Representatives elections were held in the midst of the escalating
violence.70
Liberal and nationalist politicians won the majority of seats in
the House of Representatives, as they had two years earlier during
the GNC elections. Islamist politicians were bitterly defeated.71 Violent clashes broke out between the Islamist militias, calling themselves the Libya Dawn coalition, and General Haftar’s Operation
Dignity government forces at the Tripoli International Airport.72
The fighting destroyed the airport and the Libya Dawn militias took
control of Tripoli. Libya Dawn then conducted a coup d’état in Tripoli in support of the Islamist parties that had lost the elections.73 The
elected House of Representatives, Prime Minister Adbullah alThinni, and his cabinet all fled east to the cities of Tobruk and
Beidi.74 They are backed by General Haftar’s Operation Dignity
forces.75 The Tobruk-based government was recognized by the European Union, United States, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.76
The Libya Dawn Coalition took over Tripoli and appointed its own

Id.
Id.
68 Rebecca Murray, Libya: A Tale of Two Governments, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 4, 2015),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/libya-tale-governments150404075631141.html [https://perma.cc/KNZ4-4Y5N].
69 BBC NEWS, supra note 61.
70 Id.
71 Murray, supra note 68.
72 Id.
73
Justin Salhani, The Forgotten Conflict in Libya, Explained, THINK PROGRESS
(Feb. 25, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/the-forgotten-conflict-in-libya-explained-4ffc134b0a9a#.z2nh7pqvl [https://perma.cc/E5VM-HL6G].
74 Id.
75 Murray, supra note 68.
76 Id.
66
67
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government, reinstating a new GNC as its legislature and appointing a Tripoli-based government, initially headed by Prime Minister
Omar al-Hassi.77
Since June 2014, Libya has had dueling governments in Tripoli
and Tobruk, and the country has fallen further into political and security chaos. The political and security vacuum created space for
ISIS to infiltrate Libya and to engage in violent fighting with both
governments.78 The war has left five thousand dead, half a million
Libyans homeless, ruined the Libyan economy, and caused diplomats, foreign investors, and countless Libyans themselves to leave
the country.79
3.5. United Nations-Brokered Peace Deal
United Nations-brokered peace talks first began in September
2014. On December 17, 2015, representatives from both Libyan governments signed a UN-brokered peace deal in Morocco that called
for the creation of a unity government and for forces supporting the
rival governments to cease hostilities.80 The agreement created a
Government of National Accord run by a Presidency Council as the
unified governing executive authority in Libya, and gave it responsibility for organizing the next phase of Libya’s political transition.81
In signing the peace deal, the separate governments agreed to cede
authority to this body and to encourage their militia forces to do so
as well. The agreement also called for the shoring up of the national
army and police force under the new government. The objective of
the peace deal was that a unified government, with the backing of
the international community, would be able to politically stabilize
the country and initiate joint operations against ISIS. Under the
Id.
Id.
79
Chris Stephen, Five Years After Gaddafi, Libya Torn by Civil War and Battles
with ISIS, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/16/libya-gaddafi-arab-spring-civil-war-islamic-state
[https://perma.cc/SY5G-CWSA].
80 Rival Libyan Factions Sign UN-backed Peace Deal, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 17, 2015),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/libya-rival-parliaments-sign-backeddeal-151217131709056.html [https://perma.cc/8H5P-5D6K].
81
LIBYAN POL. AGREEMENT art. 1.3 (Dec 17, 2015), https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/Libyan%20Political%20Agreement%20%20ENG%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/GU8E-FXT3].
77
78
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peace agreement, the Government of National Accord was empowered to exercise executive authority in Libya for up to two years, or
until a new Libyan Constitution was finalized and a new executive
authority was instituted pursuant to that Constitution.82
The peace agreement prioritized the completion of a constitution
as a key element of the transition. The peace deal also provided that
the parties would agree to respect the independence and impartiality of the CDA, and that the unity government would guarantee the
security of the Assembly, and create an environment that would enable it to work independently and have unhindered access and communication with all sectors of Libyan society.83 The peace agreement gave both support and direction to the CDA. The agreement
stated that the unity government would provide the necessary financial and logistical support for the CDA to complete its work.84 It
also directed the CDA to provide a roadmap with a timeline for the
completion of its work, to involve all cultural communities in its
work, and to complete its work by March 24, 2016, within three
months of the completion of the brokered agreement.85 If the CDA
did not complete its work within that three month period, responsibility for constitutional reform would revert to a committee of five
representatives, each from the House of Representatives and the
State Council (the former GNC, acting as a consultative body), with
the participation of the Presidency Council.86
3.6. The CDA Conflict Zone
The CDA ultimately met the deadline called for by the National
Accord agreement by releasing a draft constitution in February 2016;
however, that result was threatened by significant conflict throughout the CDA’s term.87 The CDA electoral rules required that elected
members receive a simple majority rather than an absolute majority

Id. at art. 1.4.
Id. at art. 48.
84 Id. at art. 49.
85 Id. at arts. 50, 52.
86 Id. at art. 52.
87
DRAFT LIBYAN CONST. (2016), http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/draft_constitution_of_libya_april_2016_unofficial_english_traslation.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZE2-LKVC].
82
83
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of all those voting.88 As a consequence, only ten of the fifty-one
members initially elected to the CDA received more than fifty percent in their respective electoral districts, and nine of the members
were elected with less than twenty-five percent of the vote in their
respective districts.89 The fact that a majority of CDA members represented a minority of their districts increased the potential for fractious disputes and deadlock within the body.90 The CDA members
were also deeply divided by the competing agendas of Libya’s three
historic regions. The representatives battled over issues such as the
system of government, national identity, the role of religion, the distribution of resources, federalism vs. decentralization, and the location of the capital and sovereign institutions.91 The civil war and
external pressure from the competing governments in Tobruk and
Tripoli, their political backers, and the broader government, increased the tensions and conflict within the CDA over these issues.92
Libya’s political factions attempted to draw the CDA into their
disputes from its inception. The CDA resisted calls by the Libyan
National Army under General Haftar to take over legislative control
from the GNC in May 2014 (one month prior to the election of the
HOR), or calls from the Supreme Council of the Judiciary to help

88
Dirk Vandewalle & Nicholas Jahr, Libya’s Unexpected Strength, N.Y. TIMES
(May 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/opinion/libyas-unexpected-strength.html [https://perma.cc/P5N5-KDSS].
89 Id.
90 Id.
91
See In Depth: Over a Year Late Libya Struggles to Finish Constitution, LIBYA
CHANNEL
(Feb.
9,
2016),
https://web.archive.org/web/20161109074013/http://en.libyaschannel.com/2016/02/09/indepth-over-a-year-late-libya-struggles-to-finish-constitution
[https://perma.cc/7ESX-ZXU9] (describing variety of the issues in contention
within the CDA); see also, Omar Ould Dedde O. Hammady & Michael MeyerResende, Saving Libya’s Constitution-Making Body, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L
PEACE (Dec. 18, 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=57565
[https://perma.cc/K7JR-SLFT] (“After all, it is the democratically elected body
tasked to find constitutional solutions to Libya’s major problems, including the
management of oil resources, decentralization, minority rights, the role of religion,
and the system of government.”).
92 See LIBYA CHANNEL, supra note 91 (stating that increasing tensions have manifested in the form of resignations and delayed results); see also, Hammady, supra
note 91 (stating that competing claims of legitimacy by two governments raises the
tension for the CDA).
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mediate political disputes between General Haftar and the GNC.93
The CDA resisted both calls saying that it was an independent body
which exclusively had the limited mandate of constitutional reform.94 Nonetheless, political issues influenced and divided the
body from within. In the committee’s early work, members staked
out maximalist positions and battled over preferred positions on a
number of issues.95 The committee publicly released a series of articles on key issues rather than a promised first draft in December
2014.96 The assembly was unable to reach agreement on issues such
as the structure of the state and the scope of decentralization—key
issues in dispute between the two competing governments in Tobruk and Tripoli, and their militia backers who had become engaged
in protracted and intense armed conflict.97
3.7. Strategic Withdrawal
The CDA members battled over process as well as substance,
and numerous boycotts and withdrawals by CDA members undermined consensus on the constitutional text. Unlike the Amazigh
who never joined the assembly, the Tebu and Touraeg took their reserved seats in the assembly in June 2014, two months after the CDA
began its work.98 However, they later boycotted the assembly again
over the assembly’s procedures established to resolve contentious
issues.99 In June 2015, Ali Tarhouni, the assembly president, formed
a 12-member working group to resolve outstanding issues that the

93
Suliman Ibrahim, Will Libya’s Constitutional Drafting Assembly Survive the
Turbulent
Times?,
IDEA
(June
6,
2014),
http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/will-libyas-constitutional-drafting-assembly-survive-turbulenttimes [https://perma.cc/8KM8-8TXP].
94 Id. (recounting that the CDA was not given a governance mandate).
95
Michael Meyer-Resende & Omar O. Hammady, These 56 People Have a
Chance to Save Libya, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 21, 2015), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/21/these-56-people-have-a-chance-to-save-libya
[https://perma.cc/29HU-CA2N] (describing the CDA’s disagreement over a number of issues at the heart of Libya’s political struggles).
96
Gluck, supra note 23, at 48 (addressing the important constitutional questions but failing to address the most contentious).
97 Id.
98 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 16.
99 Id. at 17.
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CDA had been unable to reconcile in a final draft text.100 The Tebu
and Touraeg objected to the fact that the working group was slated
to have only one member to represent the views of both minority
groups.101 Both groups found the suggestion that both groups’
views were interchangeable to be patronizing, and they promised to
never accept any document that came out of the working group.102
They resigned the commission on August 19, 2015 and asked the international community to put pressure on the assembly to respect
its prior commitments to reach agreement with minority groups on
any final text.103
The tensions over Tarhuni’s leadership and his formation of the
Working Group grew so great that in November 2015, a number of
assembly members demanded that Tarhouni resign from his position.104 Tarhouni remained but the attrition from the CDA continued. On January 18, 2016, two members of the Working Group from
Western Libya resigned over what they described as the “federalist
inclinations” of the working group.105 Ten days later on January 28,
eleven members of the CDA resigned, complaining that the Working Group was dividing Libya with “regional quotas.”106 On January 30, 2016, the Amazigh community, along with the boycotting
Tebu and Touraeg CDA members, declared that they would not accept any constitution not agreed upon by the minority communities.107 The increasing conflict within the body threatened the completion of the CDA’s work, and Tarhouni rushed to complete a
second draft, announcing its release on February 3, 2016.108 Two
weeks later, an appeals court ruled on a complaint filed by a CDA
member in January and determined that CDA President Tarhouni

LIBYA CHANNEL, supra note 91.
Mustafa Khalifa, Tuareg and Tebus Threaten to Walk Out of the Constitution
(Jun.
28,
2015),
http://www.marDrafting
Assembly,
MARSAD
sad.ly/en/2015/06/28/tuareg-and-tebus-threaten-to-walk-out-of-constitutiondrafting-assembly [https://perma.cc/CB8C-CA59].
102 Id.
103 Mustafa Khalifa, Tebus and Tuareg Members Walk Out of Constitution Drafting
Assembly, MARSAD (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.marsad.ly/en/2015/08/20/tebusand-tuareg-members-walk-out-of-constitution-drafting-assembly
[https://perma.cc/6ZQF-ZYJV].
104 LIBYA CHANNEL, supra note 91.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
100
101
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would have to leave his position in the CDA because of his dual
American citizenship.109 CDA members pledged to continue their
work to produce a final draft constitution by March 24, irrespective
of Tarhouni’s status.110
Further conflict erupted within the CDA when 32 members accepted an offer by the Sultanate of Oman, under the auspices of the
UN, to host international consultations in Oman with foreign legal
advisers on the draft text.111 The UN took a particular interest in
facilitating completion of the constitution because the peace agreement that it had brokered between Libya’s competing governments
had called for the completion of the constitution, as a key outcome.112 Nonetheless, nine constituent assembly members viewed
the sessions as inappropriate foreign interference and, consequently, boycotted the CDA.113 On April 23, 2016, the CDA announced that it adopted the amended text of the Working Group
after its consultations in Oman, and that it would forward the document to Libyan authorities for next steps, including a public referendum.114 This announcement was made notwithstanding the fact
that nearly half the CDA had not participated in the Oman sessions
and that the Amizigh, Tabu, and Touraeg communities continued in
their objections to the final text of the draft constitution.115 The status of the draft constitution was thrown into further doubt when an
Appeals Court purported to annul the draft constitution, because it
was not adopted by a quorum under the CDA’s original procedural

109
Libya in Flux as Constitution and Unity Government Face Yet More Delays,
LIBYA CHANNEL (Feb. 18, 2016),
http://web.archive.org/web/20160429225551/http://en.libyaschannel.com/2016/02/18/libya-in-flux-as-constitution-and-unity-government-faceyet-more-delays [https://perma.cc/GQ2X-3QWT].
110 Id.
111
In Depth: Libya’s Constituent Assembly Divided Over Oman Sessions, LIBYA
CHANNEL (Mar. 22, 2016),
http://web.archive.org/web/20170330072731/http://en.libyaschannel.com/2016/03/22/in-depth-libyas-constituent-assembly-divided-over-omansessions [https://perma.cc/339K-VNG8].
112 LIBYAN POL. AGREEMENT, supra note 81, arts. 47–52.
113
In Depth: Libya’s Constituent Assembly Divided Over Oman Sessions, supra
note 111.
114
CDA: Constitution Draft Is Ready, A Poll Is to Follow, LIBYAN EXPRESS (Apr.
23, 2016), http://www.libyanexpress.com/cda-constitution-draft-is-ready-a-pollis-to-follow [https://perma.cc/E2ZK-RFW8].
115 Id.
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rules.116 Despite the appellate court ruling and boycotting CDA
members’ opposition, the United Nations continued to view the
draft constitution as legitimate and encouraged the House of Representatives to put the draft to a public referendum as soon as possible
to meet the strictures of the December 2015 National Accord Agreement, which called for the transition of power from the temporary
unity government to a permanent executive authority elected pursuant to a new constitution.117 At the time of writing, the status of
the adoption of the draft constitution remains as uncertain as the
question of whether the provisions of the constitution, adopted in
the midst of significant conflict in the CDA, will foment or ameliorate divisions in Libya society. The draft text is analyzed infra Section 4.
3.8. Leveraging the Peace Deal
In the midst of a violent civil war, the CDA completed a draft
constitution but its ability to engage in widespread participatory
constitution-making was significantly impeded by the ongoing violence.118 The civil war led various ethnic, political, and tribal group
factions to contest one another over issues that were constitutional
in nature, such as the form of government, federalism, security arrangements, and the role of religion.119 Further, in the midst of civil
war, the CDA was unable to carry out national consultations about
the constitution-drafting process and did not have sufficient interaction with the political elites in Tripoli and Tobruk to confirm that
the opposing governments would recognize the new constitution.120

116 Abdulkader Assad, Al-Bayda Appeals Court Annuls the Constitution Draft,
LIBYA OBSERVER (May 9, 2016), http://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/al-bayda-appeals-court-annuls-constitution-draft [https://perma.cc/6RJ4-FD8A].
117 Article 1(4) of the National Accord Agreement called for the transition of
power from the unity government to an executive authority elected pursuant to the
new constitution, prior to or at the expiration of the unity government’s one-year
term. The unity government may be continued for an additional year if the constitution is not completed during its first year. This provision appeared to give the
CDA until the end of 2016, or the end of 2017 at the outer limit, to pass the constitution by national referendum. LIBYAN POL. AGREEMENT, supra note 81, art. 1.4.
118 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 18–21.
119 Gluck, supra note 23, at 47.
120 Id. at 48.
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The constitution-making process in Libya exhibited the classic
markers of conflict constitution-making: extreme conflicts between
drafters mirrored tensions between the Libyan-Dawn backed Islamist government in Tripoli and the Operation-Dignity backed nationalist government in Tobruk over local representation and central authority, and the Amazigh, Touraeg and Tebu minority groups
boycotted the assembly and rejected non-consensus constituent assembly solutions regarding minority rights.121 The UN-brokered
peace agreement helped to ameliorate one of the markers of conflict
constitution-making—a lack of consensus over divisive issues. The
UN peace agreement committed the governments in Tripoli and Tobruk to support the consensus solutions adopted by the CDC across
a range of divisive issues. The peace deal opened up political space
that kept the constitutional reform process on track. The peace deal
detailed the conditions for the formation of a unity government and
committed the unity government to support the work of the CDA
financially and logistically, and to provide for its security. Although
the peace deal did not resolve nor prevent all of the CDA’s internal
conflicts, it enabled constitutional reform to move forward and committed the competing governments to support the work of the body.
It remains to be seen whether the Libyan people will support the
draft constitution produced by the CDA when it is put forward for
a public referendum. I recommend measures to shore up public
support for the text infra Part 7.
4. CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN YEMEN
Just as in Libya, Yemen’s constitution-drafting process unfolded
against the backdrop of an expanding civil war. Constitution-makers were pressured by the competing interests of multiple constituencies and were unable to achieve consensus on core issues involving the structure of the state. The divisions in Yemen date back to
the formation of the country.

121
As discussed in Section 2, the markers of a conflict constitution-making
process are (1) extreme conflict amongst constitutional drafters that mirror the positions of warring belligerents, (2) an inability of drafters to reach consensus on
these political issues, and (3) boycott and rejection of non-consensual constituent
assembly choices by major blocs.
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4.1. Pre-Arab Spring Yemen
Yemen, the poorest state in the Middle East, has, in many ways,
been two states for much of its modern history. In 1904, the Ottoman
Empire and the British agreed on a demarcation line delineating
their control over the territory of Yemen.122 The demarcation line
created an Ottoman North and a British South in Yemen. When the
Ottoman Empire fell at the end of WWI, the northern part of the
country became an independent kingdom run by a Zaidi imam.123
In 1962, Arab Nationalists toppled the ruling imam and founded a
republic with Egypt’s assistance, but the new government fell into a
ten-year civil war with former royal regime loyalists backed by
Saudi Arabia.124 Southern Yemen remained a British protectorate
until 1967, when insurgents forced the British out.125 Marxists took
over the government in 1970, and the People’s Democratic Republic
of Yemen was formed with the support of the Soviet Union and communist states.126 Twenty years later, North and South Yemen
formed a united republic, ruled by the former North Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh.127 Southern leaders attempted to declare a
separate state in 1994 because of disputes over power-sharing. Saleh
led a military campaign that quashed the rebellion in the South.128
Over the next two decades, Saleh continued to build his political
power, but did not address the rampant poverty, corruption and
weak rule of law in the country, which enabled Al Qaeda to infiltrate.129 In 2000, Al Qaeda bombed the USS Cole off the coast of
Aden. The United States has engaged in drone attacks and covert
CIA operations against Al Qaeda in Yemen on an ongoing basis
since 2009.130 The country is still largely divided along tribal lines
122
Ishaan Tharoor, A Brief History of Yemen: Rich Past, Impoverished Present,
(Nov.
1,
2010),
http://content.time.com/time/world/artiTIME
cle/0,8599,2028740,00.html [https://perma.cc/XG4V-7478].
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130
The first US drone strike against terrorist individuals in Yemen occurred
in 2002. The drone attacks were resumed under President Obama in 2009. To date
there have been 172 drone strikes in Yemen that have killed over 1,100 people.
Drone Strikes: Yemen, NEW AMERICA, https://www.newamerica.org/in-
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and it has continually faced separatist movements, including one
from the Iranian-backed Shiite Zaidi Houthis.
4.2. Arab Spring Protests in Yemen
In early 2011, the wave of Arab Spring protests that began in Tunisia and spread through the Middle East and North Africa region
reached Yemen. Unemployed Yemeni youth and political activists
were joined by opposition parties and some members of the government in protest of the Saleh government. The protesters demanded
an end to pervasive corruption, better economic opportunities, political reform and the protection of human rights.131 The ten month
conflict between the protesters and the government resulted in 250
deaths, 1,000 injuries, and 100,000 displaced people.132 Government
defections, armed violence, and potential economic collapse caused
Saleh to step down from his presidency in November 2011 under a
deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)133 and supported by the United States.134 Under the terms of the deal, Saleh
ceded power to his Vice President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi until
elections could be held three months later in February 2012.135 The
GCC deal called for the formation of a transitional unity government
under Hadi, composed of members from Saleh’s party and from opposition stakeholders, and granted Saleh and his family immunity
from prosecution for human rights violations that occurred during

depth/americas-counterterrorism-wars/us-targeted-killing-program-yemen/
[https://perma.cc/ZVA8-DJX2].
131 Alma Abdul Hadi Jadallah, Conflict Assessment of the Republic of Yemen, SCH.
FOR CONFLICT ANALYSIS & RESOL. (2015), http://activity.scar.gmu.edu/sites/default/files/Yemen_CDA_Final_July.13.2015-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/77XBRW4D].
132 Id.
133
The GCC is a regional, intergovernmental economic and political union
whose members include all of the Arab states on the Persian Gulf, i.e., UAE, Qatar,
Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, except Iraq.
134 Jadallah, supra note 131, at 11.
135
Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transition Process
in Yemen in Accordance with the Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
Dec.
5,
2011,
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/YE_111205_Agreement%20on%20the%20implementation%20
mechanism%20for%20the%20transition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K58T-URP8]
[hereinafter GCC Agreement].
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his presidency and against protesters during the 2011 uprising.136
Saleh went into exile and Hadi was elected President of Yemen in
an uncontested election held in February 2012.137
4.3. The Seeds of Civil and Constitutional Conflict—National
Dialogue
The 2011 GCC-brokered transition agreement also called for a
National Dialogue consisting of stakeholders from diverse political
parties and civil society to monitor the agreement and to develop
recommendations for the interim government on the transition.138
The first National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was held in March
2013 and 565 delegates focused on issues critical to the political transition, including the threat of secession in the South, armed rebellion
in the North, national reconciliation and redress for human rights
abuses, security sector reform, and the drafting of a new constitution.139 The National Dialogue completed its work on January 24,
2014 and issued a comprehensive report with nearly 1,800 recommendations.140 Key political organization recommendations included that Hadi’s presidency should be extended for another year,
parliament should include equal representation between the North
and the South, and that Yemen should become a six region federation, with four regions in the north, two regions in the South, and an
independent capital city—Sanaa.141 While the international community was generally laudatory about the NDC outcome document,
certain Yemeni groups were critical of the result, including the Zaidi
Shiite (Houthi) Movement, and the Southern Hiraak Movement,
which each expressed concern that the six region federation would
subsume the autonomy of their territory in the South.142 Much of

Id.
Jadallah, supra note 131, at 11.
138 GCC Agreement, supra note 135, at para. 20.
139
ERICA GASTON, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, PROCESS LESSONS LEARNED IN YEMEN’S
NATIONAL DIALOGUE
3
(Feb.
2014),
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR342_Process-Lessons-Learned-in-Yemens-National-Dialogue.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7FVT-89W2].
140 Id. at 4.
141 Jadallah, supra note 131, at 12.
142 Id. at 14.
136
137
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the leadership of the Southern secessionist Hiraak Movement refused to participate in the NDC and those that did participate favored a two region federation and a referendum on outright secession from the North in three years.143 The Houthis, the armed militia
of the Zaidi Shiite sect, also preferred a two region split.144 While
the NDC agreed that the state would be comprised of a federal structure, the specific proposal for a six region federation was tabled and
excluded from the NDC’s Outcome Document due to opposition
from southern delegates.145 Two weeks after the NDC concluded its
work, President Hadi appointed an unrepresentative special committee that adopted the six region federation that southern delegates
had rejected during the NDC.146 The National Dialogue’s inability
to achieve a consensus solution regarding the structure of the state
sowed the seeds of the ensuing civil and constitutional conflict that
Yemen faced.
4.4. Conflict Over the Formation of the Constitutional Drafting
Committee
The GCC-brokered Transition Plan and the NDC Outcome Document called for the creation of a thirty-member constituent assembly to draft a new constitution.147 The membership of the constituent assembly was to mirror the NDC’s political, regional, and civil
143 Id.; INT’L CRISIS GRP., YEMEN’S SOUTHERN QUESTION: AVOIDING A BREAKDOWN
(Sept. 25, 2013), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/yemen-s-southern-question-avoiding-a-breakdown.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AGY-PR25]. See also Gluck,
supra note 23, at 50 (listing Hiraak’s refusal to participate as one of the reasons why
the NDC could not come to an agreement).
144
Yemen’s Houthis Reject Draft Constitution, PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST
DEMOCRACY,
http://pomed.org/blog-post/political-process/political-transition/yemens-houthis-reject-draft-constitution [https://perma.cc/R4HR-JX5N].
145 See GASTON, supra note 139, at 3-4 (noting that the compromise agreement
on Yemen’s future as federal state did not settle the issue of the number of subnational regions).
146 Id. at 4.
147
GCC Agreement, supra note 133, at para. 22; see also Ashraf Al-Falahi,
Yemen’s Fraught Constitution Drafting Committee, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L
PEACE
(May
2,
2014),
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=55496
[https://perma.cc/E89R-8N3F] (“In his announcement, Hadi specified that the
CDC would have seventeen members; this contradicts the agreement reached by
the nation-building team at the National Dialogue Conference, which recommended that the CDC be comprised of 30 members selected according to their area
of expertise.”).
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society representation.148 On March 8, 2014, President Hadi appointed a seventeen-member Constitutional Drafting Committee
(CDC). The CDC lacked the full representation of the NDC stakeholders called for in the GCC and NDC plans.149 Several groups,
including the Socialist party, youth groups, and the southern secessionists, expressed concern about their lack of representation in the
CDC and the representatives’ lack of expertise about constitutional
matters or federalism.150 Concern about how the CDC would approach the creation of a federal state within the constitution was a
significant concern for numerous stakeholders, as the NDC decision
to create a federal state had been contentious.151
4.5. Civil War Erupts and the Peace and National Partnership
Agreement Fails
The CDC was given only one year to complete a momentous
task—incorporating many of the NDC’s 1,800 outcomes into a constitution. Its work was frustrated by political conflict within the
body as well as civil conflict in Sanaa where it was based. In August
2014, Houthi rebels, who had long been opponents of President
Saleh’s regime, attacked Yemeni forces and took near control of
Yemen’s capital, Sanaa.152 The Houthi attacks bolstered calls by
Southern separatist groups for independence, and further threatened the viability of the CDC’s incorporation of the NDC’s proposals regarding the division of political power into a new constitution.153 Armed Houthis took control of several government
ministries in Sanaa in September 2014 following protests that demanded the formation of a new government and the restoration of
fuel subsidies.154 The UN mediated discussions between Hadi’s
GCC Agreement, supra note 135, at para. 20.
Al-Falahi, supra note 147.
150 Id.
151
See id. (noting the “fragile unity” of the Yemini population in the state
building process).
152 Gluck, supra note 23, at 52.
153 Id.
154 Arafat Madabish, Yemen: Uncertainty Over New Constitution Continues Following Kidnapping, ASHARQ AL-AWSAT (Jan. 18, 2015), https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/arafat-madabish/news-middle-east/yemen-uncertainty-overnew-constitution-continues-following-kidnapping
[https://perma.cc/6ZHU4YUP].
148
149
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transition government, the Houthis, and Southern leaders throughout late 2014, but they were unable to reach agreement on divisive
issues that could be incorporated into the CDC’s work.155
The Houthi military incursion into the capital forced the Hadi
regime to negotiate with them. Both parties agreed to a cease-fire
on the condition that Hadi form a technocratic transition government, with greater representation from the Houthis, Southern
Hiraak Movement, and other groups that had been excluded from
the post-Arab Spring GCC-led transition plan.156 In September 2014,
Yemen’s major political parties (excluding the Southern separatists)
entered into a cease-fire agreement called the Peace and National
Partnership Agreement (PNPA) with the Houthi government,
which was intended to bolster Houthi support for the Hadi transitional government, constitutional reform, and national elections.157
With respect to constitutional reform, the PNPA required the Hadi
government to work towards consensus support for the draft constitution and to expand representation within a body tasked with
overseeing the CDC and implementation of the NDC outcomes.158
The PNPA also tasked Hadi with the formation of a technocratic
government with diverse representation from Yemen’s diverse political parties.159 Although Hadi followed the agreement and established a technocratic government with Houthi and diverse political
party representation, the government was unable to fulfill its mandate for reform and to move the political transition forward due to
ongoing violence, corruption, and political division.160
The Houthis signed the PNPA as it gave them a greater role in
government ministries and legitimized their efforts to take control

Gluck, supra note 23, at 52.
Mareike Transfeld, The Failure of the Transitional Process in Yemen, GERMAN
INST. INT’L & SEC. AFF. 2–3 (Feb. 2015), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C06_tfd.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9P8B5EAF].
157 Gluck, supra note 23, at 52.
158
Peace and National Partnership Agreement arts. 8-9, Sept. 21, 2014,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/darp/dv/darp20141204_05_/darp20141204_05_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WM85-MVWH] [hereinafter PNPA].
159 PNPA, supra note 158, at art. 1.
160 Transfeld, supra note 156, at 4.
155
156
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of the government.161 Although the PNPA called for the Houthis to
put down their arms, the Houthis continued their armed expansion
across Yemen, arguing that it was necessary to combat a growing
threat from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS), both of which had taken advantage of the security vacuum in Yemen to expand.162 The Houthis
also continued their military aggression in Sanaa against President
Hadi.163 As they expanded their military campaign and took greater
territory, the Houthis ultimately ignored their commitment under
the PNPA to politically support the transition government and the
constitutional reform process.164 The declining security situation
forced the CDC to move to Abu Dhabi in November and December
to complete its work.165
The conflict within the CDC mirrored the civil conflict outside
of it. The NDC had produced over 1,800 outcomes with the intention that they would be incorporated into a new constitution by the
CDC. Many of the outcomes were incompatible and some issues
had not been resolved by the NDC. As a consequence, the CDC was
responsible for resolving divisive issues such as the federal structure
of the state, the allowance of regional constitutions, the division of
power between the national and regional governments, the treatment of sharia, women’s political participation, and transitional justice measures.166 This undertaking was made more difficult by
Saleh, his allies, and Southern separatists who consistently delayed
work within the CDC, seeking to undermine its legitimacy and the
broader transition.167 The Houthis were also spoilers and they limited their involvement in the CDC as they began to accomplish their
161
INT’L CRISIS GRP., YEMEN: IS PEACE POSSIBLE? 2 (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-peace-possible [https://perma.cc/97X5-Z4YL] [hereinafter
ICG-Yemen].
162 Gluck, supra note 23, at 52–53
163 See id. (describing the ongoing siege of Sanaa and the Houthi abduction of
President Hadi’s Chief of Staff).
164
See id. (discussing that the Houthis ignored the PNPA agreement and instead increased their military presence in the regions south and west of the capital).
165 Id.
166
Helen Lackner, YEMEN’S ‘PEACEFUL’ TRANSITION FROM AUTOCRACY: COULD
IT HAVE SUCCEEDED?, INT’L IDEA 56 (Mar. 2016), https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/yemens-peaceful-transition-from-autocracy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4MR-CMXR].
167 See id. at 57 (discussing the tension between Saleh and Southern separatists
that delayed efforts to solve problems).
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political objectives through military means.168 Unlike the Houthis,
the Southern separatists did not pursue their objectives militarily
while the CDC was active; rather, they sought to undermine the
CDC’s work by using delaying tactics and rejecting negotiated solutions to difficult issues.169
4.6. Constitutional Conflict Deepens Civil Conflict
On January 15, 2015, the CDC finalized a draft constitution and
released it to the public. The very same day, armed Houthis kidnapped Ahmed Awad Bin Mubarak, President Hadi’s Chief of Staff
and the CDC Secretary-General, as he was headed to a meeting with
President Hadi to discuss the recently-released Constitution.170 The
Houthis acknowledged that they kidnapped Mubarak in order to
prevent him from attending the meeting.171 On television, the
Houthis claimed that they had become aware of irregularities in
how the constitution had been drafted in the CDC and in how the
government was attempting to make it law.172 The Houthis believed
that the draft constitution violated the spirit of the PNPA on federalism.173 After kidnapping Mubarak, the Houthis surrounded and
bombed the presidential palace five days later on January 22, 2015,
forcing President Hadi and his government to resign.174 Hadi fled
to Saudi Arabia and the Houthis formed a Revolutionary Command
Council, and by declaration, claimed control of the country.175 The
168 See id. (explaining that the Houthis were focused on advancing their military objectives during the CDC period).
169 Id.
170 Madabish, supra note 154.
171 Mohammed Ghobari, Gunmen Hold Yemeni Official to Try to Derail New Constitution, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN0KQ0AI20150117 [https://perma.cc/K244-TGS8].
172 Id.
173 See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 161, at 3 (discussing the Houthis’ rejection
of Hadi’s version of the constitution due to its violation of PNPA’s spirit and their
turning to violence instead).
174 Id.; Menan Khater, Houthis Burn Presidential Palace Opposing Proposed Constitutional Draft, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/01/21/houthis-bomb-presidential-palace-opposing-proposed-constitutional-draft [https://perma.cc/8CN9-4NVJ].
175 See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 161, at 3 (discussing the Houthis’ formation
of a “revolutionary council” with support from the U.N. and expansion of their
military presence southward).
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Houthis formed a military alliance of convenience with their former
foe, President Saleh, and his military allies.176
Hadi returned to the southern Yemen city of Aden and renounced his prior resignation.177 President Hadi reestablished his
government in Aden with the backing of Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
and southern Yemeni factions concerned about Houthi aggression
into their territory.178 On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia began an air
campaign against the Houthi government with the goal of establishing Hadi as President. After a year of fighting, by early 2016, the
civil war between the Houthi government in Sanaa, backed by Iran,
and the Hadi government in Aden, backed by Saudi Arabia, had resulted in 6,000 deaths, including over 2,800 civilian deaths.179 At the
time this article was written, the draft constitution had not yet been
submitted to the Yemeni public for a referendum and, given the opposition of the Houthi government to its provisions, the likelihood
of consensual support for the draft text is minimal.
4.7. Failure to Consolidate Diverse Support for the CDC
A constitutional process that does not take into account the
views of competing political factions runs the risk of exacerbating
civil conflict. In Yemen, where the CDC’s work failed to reflect the
views of the Houthis and the Southern Hiraak Movement, the release of the draft constitution precipitated civil war. Yemen’s CDC
had a mandate to constitutionalize the consensus positions of the
diverse political participants in the National Dialogue. The NDC
Outcome Document called for the CDC to implement NDC political
agreements regarding the constitution and submit its draft constitution to a “National Body” oversight committee for confirmation that
the text aligned with the NDC political agreements.180 Because the
NDC did not arrive at a consensus regarding the political agreement
on the federal structure of government, any text produced by the

Id.
Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at ii.
180 See Gluck, supra note 23, at 50 (describing the National Body as an 88-member committee tasked with assessing the consistency of the draft constitution with
NDC solutions).
176
177
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CDC was subject to opposition from the Houthis.181 Unfortunately,
the NDC did not include many of the key stakeholders and political
leaders that could arrive at a political agreement that the factions
would honor.182
Further, the Houthi military takeover of parts of Sanaa in September 2014 altered the political dynamic between the Houthis and
the Hadi government, requiring a new political consensus on aspects of constitutional drafting.183 The parties tried to reach a consensus with their signing of the PNPA. However, the PNPA was
ultimately an ineffective agreement—Houthis failed to abide by
their commitment to end their military incursion and to support the
CDC draft constitution. Despite the NDC and PNPA, the constitution-making process in Yemen exhibited all of the markers of conflict constitution-making. These markers include the internal battles
in the CDC over the structure of the state, which mirrored the conflict between the Houthi and Hadi governments, the CDC’s inability
to reach an agreement with key blocs such as the Houthis and Southern Hiraak movement regarding the structure of the state, and, ultimately, the Houthis’ rejection of the final draft constitution due to
this lack of consensus. All of this led to their full takeover of the
Yemen capital. The Houthis have prevented any further action on
the draft constitution as they have seen their political objectives
more readily achieved through military force. In Section 7 of this
article, I recommend measures to move constitutional reform in
Yemen forward, building upon the significant work already undertaken.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN MULTIETHNIC
TRANSITIONING STATES
In multiethnic sectarian societies such as Libya and Yemen, intergroup conflicts are frequently a source of civil discord (hereinafter, I will refer to such conflicts as interethnic conflicts). Transitioning states have sought to address the problem of interethnic conflicts
in various ways. Some states have done so through constitutional
Id.
Id.
183
See id. at 52 (emphasizing that the unstable political environment at the
time made political bargaining and negotiations critical to the process of drafting a
stable constitution).
181
182
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structures expressly designed to accommodate ethnic cleavages.
Since interethnic conflicts are frequently regional in nature, states
have also sought to address such conflict through various forms of
federalism and decentralization. In Section 5.1, I discuss various
constitutional design approaches that address interethnic conflicts
through ethnic accommodation and ethnic moderation. In Section
5.2, I discuss models of constitutional design that address interethnic regional conflicts through federalism and decentralization.
5.1. Models for Multiethnic Governance
Comparative constitutional scholarship refers to two constitutional design approaches for addressing interethnic conflicts in
highly divided societies: consociationalism and centripetalism.184
Consociational and centripetal design features are incorporated into
constitutions and electoral laws in order to secure multiethnic support for a state’s democratic institutions of governance. Consociationalism focuses on the accommodation of ethnic groups through
guaranteed group representation in governing bodies. Centripetalism focuses on the moderation of ethnic group views through the
election of moderate officials that represent multiethnic constituencies.
5.1.1. Consociationalism — Ethnic Accommodation
Under consociational democracy, ethnic groups are granted a
fair amount of autonomy over their affairs, a veto or partial veto
over the central government’s decisions, and proportional representation in government institutions.185 Consociationalism is designed
to protect ethnic groups from harm by other ethnic groups or by the
central government.186 Because consociationalism seeks to protect
184 See Donald Horowitz, Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in
Post-Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1213, 1216–17 (2008) (explaining the difference between the consociationalism design, which is centered on a “regime of
guarantees,” and the centripetalism design, which focuses on electoral incentives).
185
See Karol Edward Soltan, Constitution-Making at the Edges of Constitutional
Order, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1409, 1423–24 (2008) (elaborating on the defining
characteristics of a consociational democracy).
186 Id. at 1424.
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competing groups, one scholar has described consociationalism as
“a peace treaty extended into the workings of government.”187 Consociationalists recognize and accommodate ethnic group identity
and give them status qua ethnic groups within democratic institutions. Consociationalists advocate for multiethnic governing coalitions—parliamentary, executive, and administrative positions are
allocated on a proportional group basis through proportional parliamentary electoral systems, multiethnic cabinets that operate by
consensus, and proportional hiring in the civil service and the military.188 Consociationalists guarantee multiethnic outcomes through
multiethnic “seats” in bodies. Under consociational models, a majoritarian democracy accommodates ethnic diversity through the explicit guarantee of ethnic representation in political bodies. Some
have critiqued consociationalism by saying that it accommodates
ethnic extremists because group representatives represent “their”
ethnic group exclusively.189
Within the MENA region, consociational democratic features
have been attempted in highly divided multiethnic states. Lebanon
was a consociational democracy from its independence in 1943 until
its civil war in 1975.190 In the mid-twentieth century, Lebanon was
30% Maronite Christian, 20% Sunni Muslim, 18% Shiite Muslim, and
11% Greek Orthodox. Lebanon had smaller sects of either Christian
or Muslim background.191 Lebanon had a quasi-presidential system
that included a Maronite president, a Sunni prime minister, a Shiite
chairman of the legislature, and a Greek Orthodox deputy chairman
and deputy prime minister.192 The cabinet was also a grand coalition
in which all of the sects were proportionately represented.193 A plurality and multimember electoral system resulted in a parliament
that consistently had a ratio of six Christian members to every five

Id.
See Horowitz, supra note 184, at 1216 (emphasizing that the consociationalist design is rooted in the principle of proportional inclusion and a group culture).
189 Id. at 1216–17.
190
See Samuel Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict
Societies, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 86, 97 (2001) (citing Arend Lijpart, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL
SOCIETIES (1977)) (discussing an example of a plural society that successfully incorporated the features of a consociational democracy).
191
AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE
EXPLORATION 147 (1977).
192 Id. at 148.
193 Id.
187
188
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Muslim members.194 This system worked effectively for more than
thirty years.195 Iraq also adopted consociational democratic features
following the passage of its 2004 interim transitional constitution
and its 2005 permanent constitution to address significant political
tensions among the Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish communities. The interim constitution created a tri-partite Presidency Council, consisting of a President and two Vice Presidents and the 2005 constitution
created a Speaker and two Deputy Speakers.196 Both the interim and
permanent constitutions authorized a Prime Minister and Council
of Ministers.197 During the transition period, the Prime Minister routinely selected two Deputy Prime Ministers. By political agreement,
each of the positions within these tri-partite leadership bodies was
filled by a Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish official.198
5.1.2. Centripetalism — Ethnic Moderation
Centripetal democracies are designed to reward moderate behavior at the expense of extremists. Centripetal design features in
constitutions and electoral laws incentivize moderate politicians
within ethnic groups to compromise with moderate politicians in
other ethnic groups.199 Centripetal democracies contain mechanisms to elevate moderate ethnic representatives and parties, such

Id.
Id.
196 See IRAQ: LAW OF 2004 OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD Mar. 8, 2004, art. 36, http://www.refworld.org/docid/45263d612.html
[http://web.archive.org/web/20171030192021/http://www.refworld.org/docid/45263d612.html] [hereinafter TAL] (establishing the Presidency Council). TAL
was adopted by the Iraq Governing Council while Iraq was administered by the
U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority and served as a post-Saddam interim constitution; see also Dustūr Jumhūrīyat al-ʻIrāq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005, art. 54 (establishing a Speaker and two Deputy Speakers).
197
TAL, art. 38 supra note 196; Article 76, Dustūr Jumhūrīyat al-ʻIrāq [The
Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005, supra note 194.
198 See Sean D. Murphy, ed., Coalition Laws and Transition Arrangements During
Occupation of Iraq, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 604 (2004) (recounting the appointment of
Sheik Ghazi al-Yawar, a Sunni Muslim, to the position of Iraqi interim president,
along with a Kurd and a Shia Muslim as his deputy presidents).
199 See Soltan, supra note 185, at 1424 (explaining that the centripetal approach
focuses on collaboration among moderate politicians at the expense of excluding
extremists).
194
195
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as multiethnic electoral districts and interethnic coalitions.200 Centripetalists believe that these approaches support moderation because individual representatives and coalition members must represent a multiplicity of views, rather than the views of their ethnic
group exclusively. Centripetalists apply a wide range of tools to
support moderates such as the alternative vote—a system that allows for the interethnic exchange of second and subsequent voting
preferences, and requiring electoral victors to receive a plurality of
the vote across an ethnically diverse territorial area.201
Centripetal arrangements that encourage the election of moderates with a multiethnic perspective can take many forms. Nigeria
adopted electoral reforms that required presidential candidates to
obtain not only a plurality of the national vote, but also 25% of the
vote in two thirds of its provinces, to encourage candidates with a
moderate multiethnic outlook.202 Papua New Guinea adopted the
alternative vote system which required candidates to obtain support
from multiple groups in their constituencies in order to pass the majority vote threshold; after the country dropped alternative voting,
candidates were elected based upon their ethnic group pluralities
and interethnic group conflict increased.203 Centripetalism is most
effective in states that have heterogeneous electoral districts where
the interethnic pooling of votes can occur.204
5.2. Models for Allocation of State Power in Divided States
The civil conflicts in Libya and Yemen reflect significant ethnoregional tensions (discussed supra Sections 3 and 4). The allocation
of state power between the central and local governments was a
driver of civil conflict in both countries. Comparative constitutional
scholars have suggested various models of allocating state power to

200 See Horowitz, supra note 184, at 1217 (explaining that the underlying mechanism of the centripetal approach consists of politicians compromising on ethnic
issues in order to appeal for voter support from disparate ethnic groups).
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1224.
203 Id. at 1224–5.
204 See id. at 1225 (explaining that without interethnic vote pooling, legislators,
who represent smaller and more ethnically homogenous areas, have smaller incentives to appeal to other ethnic groups for support).
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address ethno-regional conflict. These models include ethnic federalism and political decentralization, which focus on the devolution
of state power in a manner intended to reduce ethnic divisions.
5.2.1. Ethnic Federalism
Federalism refers to the sharing of state power between a national authority and subnational or regional authority.205 Ethnic federalism is “a term used to describe a particular set of governmental
arrangements specifically designed to ameliorate conflict among or
between [ethnic] subgroups in a sharply divided state.”206 Ethnic
federalism is a form of consociationalism as it reflects the elements
of that system: (1) executive power-sharing among the representatives of all significant groups; (2) a high degree of internal autonomy
for groups that wish to have it; (3) proportional representation and
proportional allocation of civil service positions and public funds;
and (4) a minority veto on the most vital issues.207 As with other
forms of consociationalism, some scholars have questioned whether
ethnic federalism exacerbates or ameliorates ethnic conflict.208 Ethnic federalism has been part of the transitional constitution-making
process in several states that have experienced ethno-regional conflicts such as South Africa, Ethiopia, and Iraq.209 While systems of
federalism often differ, some of the characteristics of a constitutional
system premised on ethnic federalism are as follows:

205 See Alemante G. Selassie, Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa,
28 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 56–58 (2003) (explaining that federalism contains two essential
attributes: (1) dispersion of power among many centers of authority and (2) existence of constitutional mandates that legitimize the various centers of authority’s
claims of rights against the central government).
206 Id. at 54 (internal citations omitted). See e.g., Ludsin, supra note 22, at 290
(describing the insertion of ethnic federalism clauses into Nepal’s 2006 Interim Constitution, which led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord later that
year).
207
David Wippman, International Law and Ethnic Conflict on Cyprus, 31 TEX.
INT’L L. J. 141, 173 n.220 (1996).
208
See Selassie, supra note 205, at 86 (asserting that ethnic federalism exacerbates ethnic distrust and social discord because it deliberately and openly highlights ethnic differences that might otherwise fade with time).
209 See Horowitz, supra note 184, at 1218 (discussing how both consociationalists and centripetalists support federal approaches to governance, although for different reasons).
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5.2.1.1. Protections for Cultural and Linguistic Identity
The protection of an ethnic group’s distinct cultural and linguistic identity within a broader national culture frequently underlies an
ethnic group’s desire for political autonomy. The South African
Constitution recognizes ethnic groups’ rights to their own languages and cultures, and reinforces those rights through a federal
form of government that empowers provinces to protect those
rights.210
5.2.1.2. Ethnicity-Based “Self-Rule”
Some states have permitted subnational “self-rule” on the basis
of ethnic identity to address ethnic groups’ desire for cultural, linguistic and political autonomy. For example, the Ethiopian Constitution provides for a model of ethnic federalism that allows subnational groups to have self-governing status on the basis of their
ethnic identity.211 The entire Ethiopian state is organized along an
ethnic federal form of government that consists of nine ethnic based
federal states.212 Most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) states have
avoided Ethiopia’s model of constitutional recognition of federal
self-rule, but ethnic groups have continued to press for ethnic-based
federal self-rule in a number of SSA countries, often because of their
historic presence and concentration in particular regions of a country.213

Selassie, supra note 205, at 54.
See id. (discussing the inclusive approach to ethnic identity that the Ethiopian Constitution provides).
212 See id. at 54–55 (noting that eight of the nine provinces were organized along
ethnic lines to make the province the principle vehicle for aggregating major ethnic
groups’ political, cultural, and linguistic identity). The Ethiopian model of ethnic
federalism goes much further than South Africa’s model which does not organize
provinces primarily along ethnic lines.
213 See id. at 60 (highlighting the fact that many ethnic groups within African
countries have staged uprisings against the central government to demand official
recognition of their separate social identities).
210
211
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5.2.1.3. Subnational Constitutions
Some, but not all, federal systems permit subnational units to
create their own constitutions. Some subnational constitutional
scholars have argued that merely the authority to create a subnational constitution, even if it is not exercised, can serve important
conflict reduction goals.214 The transition constitutions of South Africa and Iraq both included provisions which allowed for regional
governments to develop subnational constitutions as part of the
power-sharing arrangement negotiated among major ethnic
groups.215 In some circumstances, difficult issues that could not be
resolved during national constitution-making processes, can be deferred to the regional constitution-making process.216
5.2.1.4. Political and Legal Autonomy
Federal systems are designed to provide a degree of autonomy
to regional governments to resolve legal and political and governance matters left to their competency by the national constitution.
Though rare, some federal arrangements, such as the Ethiopian
Constitution, provide an option for a region to secede.217 However,
it is more typical for negotiators to grant significant autonomy, short

214 See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Authorizing Subnational Constitutions in Transnational Federal States: South Africa, Democracy, and the KwaZulu-Natal Constitution, 41
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 585, 589–90 (2008) (discussing how, although certain provinces did not create their own subnational constitutions, gaining the authority to do
so was an important part of the political settlement to mitigate inter-ethnic conflict).
215
See id. (describing the strategic provisions in transition constitutions that
help create a smooth transition of power); see generally Michael J. Kelly, The Kurdish
Regional Constitutional within the Framework of the Iraqi Federal Constitution: A Struggle
for Sovereignty, Oil, Ethnic Identity, and the Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause,
114 PENN ST. L. REV. 707 (2010) (discussing the creation and adoption of the Kurdish
regional constitution).
216
See Kelly, supra note 215, at 746 (discussing that one such issue left unresolved in the federal constitution was the status of the oil rich city of Kirkuk in Iraq,
wherein both Baghdad and the Region of Kurdistan wanted to maintain control of
Kirkuk and the Iraqi constitution deferred resolution of the issue to a referendum;
ultimately, the regional Kurdish constitution defined Kirkuk as part of the Kurdish
region).
217 See Selassie, supra note 205, at 54 (discussing how the ethnic-federal system
of government in Ethiopia enables it to accommodate ethnic groups’ cultural, linguistic, and political decisions).
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of secession, to ethnic groups, such as the Kurds in Iraq, in order to
keep the regional ethnic group within the state.218
5.2.2. Political Decentralization
Whereas federal governments share political power with regional governments, unitary states decentralize administrative authority to local governments, as an extension of unitary national
power.219 Federal systems create subnational (regional) governance
structures such as governors, regional parliaments, and regional
courts that exercise exclusive or concurrent powers with the central
government. Unlike federalism, unitary state decentralization does
not require the creation of subnational regional governance structures to share power with the central government. Decentralization
is an administrative delegation of central authority to subordinate
geographic or functional units.220 Unitary states may engage in decentralization by devolving central authority to the local level.221
The objectives of federalism and decentralization may also differ. As discussed supra, federalism can ease tensions in highly divided societies with ethnic groups centered in different regions by
providing a degree of ethno-regional autonomy.222 In a democratic
system, decentralization serves important objectives beyond the
mere administration of central authority—decentralization fosters
democratic stability by supporting individual rights and collective
self-government.223 One scholar argues that democratic decentralization gives people better incentives, more opportunity to exercise

218
See Kelly, supra note 215, at 726 (explaining that the Kurds settled for a
federal structure of autonomy and regionalism).
219 CTR. FOR CONST. TRANSITIONS ET AL., DECENTRALIZATION IN UNITARY STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE ARAB STATES REGION 11 (2014) [hereinafter
DECENTRALIZATION IN UNITARY STATES].
220
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on A National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910 (1994).
221
See Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 2 (2002)
(arguing that in some circumstances unitary governments devolve even more
power to local governments than federal systems).
222 See DECENTRALIZATION IN UNITARY STATES, supra note 219, at 12 (noting that
one goal of a federal system of governance is to ease tensions between different
groups in society).
223
See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case
for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187, 190–91 (2005) (critiquing Rubin and Feely for
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their rights, and less reason to oppress one another.224 These are the
precise interests that individuals in highly divided ethno-regionally
diverse societies have in a reconstructed state—the ability to exercise their rights free of oppression.
In examining the different forms by which democratic decentralization may occur, it is helpful to use Professor Hills’ rubric of federalist, unitary, and localist democracies.225 The attributes of a federalist democracy were discussed supra. A unitary democracy exists
where the central government may devolve power and responsibilities to a subnational local entity but that entity or subnational unit
receives no protections in the national constitution or law—its authority and existence are at the whim of the central government. In
a unitary democracy, the local subnational unit exists merely as an
instrumentation of the central government and carries out national
law in accordance with local conditions.226 In a localist democracy,
the local government is granted authority under the national constitution, which protects it from interference by the national government (or regional government, if one exists) in its areas of competency.227
In ethno-regionally divided societies, a federalist or localist democracy may each be beneficial, as both approaches comprise constitutional guarantees that ethnic groups will have control over their
affairs at the regional and/or local level. In some circumstances, a
decentralized localist democracy might be preferred to a federalist
democracy. For example, national governments might fear that an
ethnically-defined regional government in a highly divided state
might seek to declare independence from the state—a recurring fear
of the national governments of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey, regarding Iraq’s Kurdish Region.228 Devolving power to local authorities

characterizing the value of decentralization as primarily being administrative efficiency, and stating that it serves fundamental purposes crucial to democracy).
224 See id. at 191 (arguing that decentralization feeds into the goals of self-government).
225
See id. at 195–99 (distinguishing decentralized regimes into “federalist,”
“unitary,” or “localist” based on the central government’s power to regulate and
interfere with local governments).
226 See id. at 198 (discussing how subnational governments in a unitary democracy don’t receive legal protection, and thus function to carry out national law).
227 Id. at 199.
228
See Kelly, supra note 215, at 726 (noting Syria, Iran, and Turkey’s concern
that an independent Kurdistan may lead to secessionist movements among their
own Kurdish populations). This fear of ethnic secession is not unfounded. As the
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rather than to regional governments is an alternative constitutional
design option that supports local autonomy, without empowering a
regional government that might compete with the state. In divided
multiethnic states, such as Kosovo, the creation of decentralized local governments across ethnic lines helped to prevent the partition
of the state along ethnic lines by creating local institutions in which
Kosovar Serbs and Albanians cooperated. In such environments, local decentralization fosters national unity and stability to a greater
degree than regional federalism.229
The MENA region has a history of highly centralized and authoritarian state structures, with weak democratic practices and
very little decentralization.230 Over the past decade, Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, Jordan and Oman have held local government council elections. However, the councils have had little to no authority delegated to them from the central government.231 In Egypt, local people’s councils elected under Mubarak had no authority over local
executive officials who were representatives of central government
ministries.232 The Arab Spring transitions opened up political space
for the devolution of power away from the central government
throughout the MENA region. However, the quality and nature of
the political decentralization in a specific state will determine
whether it fosters greater democratic accountability and local citizen
engagement. The models of political governance and state power
allocation that Libya and Yemen adopted in their draft constitutions
are assessed in Section 6.
International Court of Justice determined in its Advisory Opinion regarding Kosovo’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence, such declarations of independence
by ethnically defined regions are not violations of general international law and
may represent a people’s appropriate exercise of their right to self-determination;
see also Elena Cirkovic, An Analysis of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s Unilateral
Declaration of Independence, 11 German L.J. 895, 900 (2010) (discussing the dialogue
surrounding the right to external self-determination and the recognition of states
that do break off within the broader arena of international law).
229 See DECENTRALIZATION IN UNITARY STATES, supra note 219, at 30 (explaining
that decentralization preserves national stability by broadening citizenship participation and fragmenting central power).
230 See id. at 14 (noting that political elites within the region have traditionally
exploited nationalism and regional conflicts to preserve the need for strong, centralized states).
231
Out of these four governments, Jordan is the only one that has delegated
some of its central authority to the local government councils, although it revoked
it shortly after. See id. at 35–36 (characterizing recent waves of decentralization
within the MENA region as “primarily cosmetic.”).
232
Id. at 36.
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6. CONFLICT CONSTITUTIONS IN LIBYA AND YEMEN
Despite their ongoing civil wars, both Yemen and Libya produced draft constitutions in 2015 and early 2016. Both countries addressed regional and sectarian divisions in distinct ways. Libya
opted for unitary decentralization, concentrating power at the national level and devolving limited authorities to the governorate and
local level. Yemen adopted a federal structure with consociational
design features at the national level and significant allocation of
power to the regions. Both constitutions, however, contained elements that promised to prolong the conflicts that sparked the civil
wars and impacted the constitutional drafting processes.
6.1. Libya’s 2016 Draft Constitution
Libya’s draft constitution fails to include consociational or centripetal design features that explicitly accommodate or moderate
ethnic group divisions. And rather than designing a federal system
that empowers Libya’s three historic regions as political entities, the
CDA instead drafted a constitution that creates a “unitary” state system by concentrating power in the central government and devolving more limited authorities to local councils. This unitary decentralized state design is referenced in the constitution’s preamble,
where the drafters exhort the preservation of the country’s unity by
continuing “with the establishment of the Libyan State in 1951 with
the three provinces (Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan), then their
transition into a united states as of 1963.”233 The 1963 transition refers to the removal of federal provisions from the 1951 constitution
and the formation of ten governorates and local municipalities.234
The drafters appear to avoid the creation of regional organizational
structures that might be perceived as competition to the central government. Article I of the constitution makes this clear by stating that

DRAFT LIBYAN CONST., supra note 87, pmbl.
See Schnelzer, supra note 24, at 32 (recounting that rapid economic changes,
which were spurred by the 1959 discovery of vast oil reserves in Libya, created social conflicts between the Libyan people and their political leadership and motivated the 1963 administrative transition).
233
234
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Libya shall be an “indivisible state” and that “it shall not be permissible to relinquish any part of its sovereignty nor its territory.”235
The fact that drafters opted for a unitary state without competing
regional power structures is not surprising given Libya’s history of
regional tensions and the desire of nationalists in the CDA to continue the concentration of power in the central government.
The draft constitution, however, did not sufficiently address the
underlying tensions that led to civil war between the Libyan Dawn
and Operation Dignity forces, or that led minority groups to boycott
the CDA’s constitution-drafting process. The Libyan Dawn coalition’s pursuit of political power through arms was catalyzed by the
defeat of Islamist politicians in the parliamentary elections for the
House of Representatives. The constitution favorably addressed an
issue of importance to Islamists by providing that sharia shall be the
source for legislation and creating a council of Islamic experts to
opine on the requirements of Islamic law.236 The constitution also
prohibits the existence of paramilitary organizations or security
forces outside of the state run army—a provision likely to lead to
significant opposition from the Islamist affiliated Libyan Dawn
forces and Libya’s many extensive paramilitary organizations.237
The enforcement of the provision by state security forces will likely
lead to significant armed opposition from Libya’s militia groups, as
occurred during General Haftar’s Operation Dignity efforts to quell
militia activity.
The constitution also failed to sufficiently address the concerns
of minority groups, which raises the potential for minority opposition to the constitution and sustained conflict. The CDA, whose minority group members left in boycott as discussed supra Section 3.3.,
enshrined a specific preference for Arabic identity and Arabic language into the constitution, by declaring Libya to be an Arabic State
and declaring Arabic as Libya’s official language.238 The CDA also
limited the offices of President and Prime Minister exclusively to
Muslims.239 While minority languages are given some protection
under various provisions, Arabic and Muslim identity are clearly favored statuses under the constitution.240 The provisions adopted by
235
236
237
238
239
240

DRAFT LIBYAN CONST., supra note 87, art. 1.
Id. at art. 8, 172.
Id. at art. 192.
Id. at art. 2.
Id. at art. 110, 125.
Id. at art. 2, 64, 117.
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the CDA would have faced opposition from minority groups if they
had continued their involvement within the CDA. Because the CDA
developed language addressing minority group rights without minority group input, the CDA risked long term minority group opposition to the constitution and sustained conflict over its provisions. The CDA could have opted for a consociational model of
governance and allocated reserved seats in parliament and in executive institutions to minority groups in order to secure their support. However, they missed this opportunity.
The draft Libyan constitution also provides the foundation for
continued conflict between local authorities and the central government. The constitution states that local authorities will have autonomous, transferrable, and shared powers with the central government but it does not define how those shared powers will be
exercised in concert with the central government.241 As such, the
constitution is a unitary democracy, rather than a localist democracy. As discussed supra Section 5, a localist democracy grants and
protects local competencies, whereas in a unitary democracy, the authorities of the local entity are at the whim of the central government. Undefined political decentralization in the constitution can
lead to the national government granting and revoking limited authorities, as occurred in Jordan. The lack of defined local authority
will lead to disputes when local concerns conflict with national priorities. The constitution also provides that in addition to receiving
centralized resources, local governments will have the authority to
raise local taxes and the central government will ensure financial
balance among local government units.242 This provision along with
a provision giving the central government control over natural resources and the ability to redistribute those resources among regions is likely to lead to local and regional conflicts surrounding the
distribution of resources.243
Many of the conflicts embedded in the draft constitution were
foreseeable given Libya’s sectarian divisions but the conflict-ridden
drafting process ensured non-consensual results. Minority groups
opposed certain provisions because they were effectively excluded
from the process and the Islamist Libya Dawn coalition opposed an
elected constituent assembly in which Islamists were not significantly represented. Despite these tensions surrounding the CDA,
241
242
243

Id. at art. 158.
DRAFT LIBYAN CONST., supra note 87, art. 159.
Id. at art. 185.
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the United Nations was able to garner consensus political support
for Libya’s draft constitution with the December 2015 UN Brokered
Political Agreement. The peace agreement, supported by both the
Tobruk and Tripoli governments, created one unified national government and committed both warring factions to support the work
of the CDA. This commitment offers hope that despite the CDA’s
internal disputes, both parties to the civil war may ultimately seek
their political objectives peacefully under the constitutional regime
established by the draft constitution.244 For long term constitutional
stability, the Libyan public will need to accept any new constitution
as legitimate. Section 7 will discuss steps that the Libyan government can take to increase public support for the constitution.
6.2. Yemen’s 2015 Draft Constitution
The CDC’s completion of a draft constitution precipitated the
Houthi bombing of the Presidential Palace and takeover of Yemen’s
capital city, Aden.245 In justifying the Houthi’s actions, Abdel Malik
Al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthi movement, went on television
and announced that he opposed the draft constitution because it did
not implement the NDC outcomes, failed to reflect the views of the
Houthis and Southern groups, and that in creating six regions, the
constitution would “tear Yemen apart and . . . raise more conflict.”246 The draft constitution released by the CDC reflected the

244 As of the time of writing, the unity government—Government of National
Accord—has been installed in Tripoli. The Libya Dawn backed General National
Congress in Tripoli disbanded, although its supporting militias continue to operate
in Tripoli. The General Haftar-based House of Representatives in Tobruk has continued to operate in the East. Ken Hanly, Op-Ed: Libyan Government of National Accord Asks for NATO Training Help, DIGITAL J. (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/world/op-ed-libyan-government-of-national-accord-asksfor-nato-training-help/article/486099 [https://perma.cc/6QJV-3K66].
245 See Menan Khater, Houthis Bomb Presidential Palace Opposing Proposed Constitutional Draft, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/01/21/houthis-bomb-presidential-palace-opposing-proposed-constitutional-draft [https://perma.cc/8CN9-4NVJ] (reporting on Houthi
rebel militias’ decision to bomb the presidential palace after they took over much
of Sanaa in September 2015).
246 Id.
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NDC’s tabled proposal to create a federal state with six regions.247
Although the NDC did not agree to the proposal, three weeks after
the NDC produced its outcomes, President Hadi convened a small
committee that adopted the six-region solution over the objection of
Southern leaders.248 From the perspective of the Houthis and the
Southern Hiraak Movement leaders, the six region federal solution
was an illegitimate approach.
In addition to the conflict over the federal structure of the state,
the division of authority between the regions and the central government will continue to be a source of conflict between nationalists
and Southern Secessionists and other groups desiring regional autonomy. Yemen’s 2015 draft constitution appears to give concessions to both sides. It creates an empowered national government
with consociational features to ensure broad representation from the
regions. By creating a federal structure, the constitution also devolves certain authorities to the six regions.
Ethno-sectarian divisions in Yemen exist along geographic and
religious lines. Shiite Muslims of the Zaidi denomination are located in the Western mountainous regions and comprise forty percent of Yemeni society—the Houthis are political actors of Zaidi
background.249 Both coasts and the southeastern interior of Yemen
are populated primarily by Sunni Muslims of the Shaffii denomination, who make up more than 50% of Yemen’s population.250 The
draft constitution creates four regions (Aljanad, Azal, Sheba,
Tahamh) in the north and two regions (Aden, Hadramaut) in the
south based upon Yemen’s existing provinces (also known as “wilayas”).251 The draft constitution subsumes the Saada wilaya, the
Houthi’s home base, within the Northern two-province Azal region.252 This raised concerns for the Houthis that their political
247
2015 DRAFT YEMENI CONST., art. 391, http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/2015%20-%20Draft%20constitution%20%28English%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/379J-4SYV] (last visited October
23, 2017).
248
See GASTON, supra note 139, at 4 (explaining that the six-region proposal,
comprised of four northern and two southern regions, was adopted by a special
committee that was hand selected by President Hadi despite NDC’s recommendation to table the issue for future resolution).
249
Babak Ghafarzade, Yemen: Post-Conflict Federalism to Avoid Disintegration,
48 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 933, 942 (2016).
250 Id.
251 2015 DRAFT YEMENI CONST., supra note 247, art. 391.
252 See Ghafarzade, supra note 249, at 994 (explaining that while the draft constitution did not change any borders of the existing wilayas, its establishment of new
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power and autonomy would be diluted under the new region and
prompted their military takeover of Sanaa.253 The division of the
South, into four separate regions, rather than one—may have been
intended by nationalists as a bulwark against secession. The Southern Hiraak Movement’s opposition to the creation of multiple regions in the South will embed a lingering conflict into the final constitution should it be adopted.254
Although Yemen’s draft constitution expressly prohibits racial,
sectarian, and religious parties, its provisions support de facto ethnic federalism.255 Consociational features in the constitution provide for diverse representation from Yemen’s ethno-religious sects
based upon geographic, rather than explicitly sectarian, allocation.256 For example, the House of Representatives, the lower chamber of the parliament is made up of 260 representatives elected under a closed proportional list system and after the first legislative
cycle, the Southern Regions of Aden and Hadhramout are guaranteed 40% representation in the legislature.257 The eighty-four member Federal Council, the upper house of parliament, is represented
with an equal number of twelve representatives from each of the six
regions and six representatives from the cities of Aden and Sanaa
(the competing capitals).258 This model guarantees that the Shaffi,
Southern Hiraak, and other southern sectarian groups will have 40%
representation in the legislature. It also guarantees that ethnically
defined regional strongholds such as the Houthi home base in Azal
will have an equal number of representatives in the legislature as
other regions. Consociational features also apply to the courts and
the armed services. The Supreme Federal Judicial Council includes
one member of the High Court of each region.259 Further, the Con-

federal regions created social tensions because they did not wholly track existing
religious divisions).
253 See id. at 994–95 (speculating that further contest over the creation of new
federal regions might lead to increased violence and calls for secession).
254
See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 143, at ii (noting that Yemeni hopes for a
more stable future depend upon both sides’ abilities to establish basic trust, legitimacy, and consensus within negotiations).
255 2015 DRAFT YEMENI CONST., supra note 247, art. 13.
256 Id. at art. 13(5) (“It is prohibited to establish political parties and organizations on the basis of racial, sectarian or doctrinal grounds.”)
257 Id. at arts. 138–39.
258 Id. at art. 141.
259 Id. at art. 219.
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stitutional Court is to include representation from all of the regions.260 The regions are also entitled to equitable representation in
the command structures of the armed forces (as determined by
law).261 Additional concessions are given to the Southern Regions—
for example, decisions in the Federal Council are taken by majority
vote, but if two-thirds of the representatives from Southern regions
oppose a decision dealing with natural resources including oil and
gas, electoral law matters, regional boundaries, the shape of the Federal State, the special status of the city of Aden, or any constitutional
amendment relevant to Southern representation, they may veto the
proposal.262
Some features in the constitution could also be considered centripetal, in that they encourage ethnic moderates who can appeal to
multiethnic constituencies. Candidates for President must be endorsed by 5% of the members of one of the national legislative bodies, or by signatures of 6,000 voters from a majority of regions, with
at least 500 signatures from each region.263 The President and Vice
President are elected together on the same ticket provided they hail
from different regions.264
In addition to ensuring diverse regional representation at the
federal level, Yemen’s draft constitution also envisions empowered
regional governments. The constitution creates a parallel structure
to the national government at the regional level, including executive, legislative and judicial branches. Like at the national level, regional parliaments are elected under a proportional list system.265
The parliaments are given the authority to pass laws on regional
matters based on competencies defined in the constitution.266 The
regional government has competencies some of which are exclusive267 and others of which are concurrent with the national government.268 The constitution also establishes regional governors with

260
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263
264
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Id. at art. 329.
Id. at art. 311
Id. at art. 143.
Id. at art. 183.
Id. at art. 180.
Id. at art. 230.
Id. at art. 237.
Id. at art. 337.
Id. at art. 336.
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executive authority.269 First level courts are established in the districts, appellate courts in the wilayas and supreme courts in the regions.270 The rulings of the regional supreme courts are final, except
for matters falling in the competency of the Federal Supreme
Court.271 The Constitution also requires that each regional legislature draft and adopt a regional constitution, provided that it may
not conflict with the federal constitution.272 Each region is tasked
with passing its own regional budget and local laws.273 The constitution also bans political parties, individuals, or groups from forming armed wings or militias.274
While these consociational features are intended to address regional and sectarian divisions, the Houthis rebel movement and
Southern Hiraak Movement separatists have made clear their opposition to a six-region state and their preference for a two-region
country.275 Given the ongoing civil war and the diverging positions
of the competing governments on the structure of the federal government, the draft constitution is likely to be an ongoing source of
conflict—unless a political agreement between the competing governments can be reached through a peace process similar to the UN
negotiated peace settlement in Libya. Section 7 will discuss steps
that the Yemeni people and international community can take to
consolidate support for the draft constitution and contribute to stability in Yemen.
7. WAY FORWARD
In Libya and Yemen, active civil war constrained the ability of
constitution-makers to engage in widespread participatory constitution-making—which led to protracted conflict within the drafting
bodies and limited the ability of drafters to adopt solutions reflecting national consensus. This lack of consensus among key factions
embedded unresolved conflicts into the draft constitutional texts.
Id. at art. 239.
Id. at art. 226.
271 Id.
272 Id. at art. 237.
273 Id.
274 Id. at art. 14.
275 GASTON, supra note 139, at 4–5; Gluck, supra note 23, at 50; Yemen’s Houthis
Reject Draft Constitution, supra note 144.
269
270
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Such conflict constitution-making processes require rehabilitation to
ensure that the resulting constitutions contribute to, rather than detract from, societal stability and reconciliation.
Rehabilitated conflict constitution-making can provide for revised institutional arrangements brokered as part of a peace deal, in
anticipation that later participatory processes will allow for public
engagement in broader institutional reforms. The constitutions
should include mechanisms which allow for transparency and public participation in critical matters—one such mechanism is the deferral of key issues to later enactment by a legislature, public referendum or constitutional amendment. 276 Such deferred issues might
include the drafting of electoral laws, provincial authority laws, territorial boundaries or regional constitutions. For example, the 2005
Iraqi constitution deferred several difficult issues that could not be
resolved by the constitutional drafting bodies to future legislatures
and public referenda including a provincial powers law, electoral
law, hydrocarbons law, and disputed territorial boundaries.277 Similar procedural and substantive measures can be undertaken in
Libya and Yemen.

7.1. Libya
Libya’s conflict constitution-making process was rescued from
its stalemate when the United Nations brokered a peace agreement
that committed the warring governments in Tripoli and Tobruk to
support the completion of the constitution-making process. While
the UN-brokered peace agreement opened up space for the completion of the draft constitution, the process under which it was drafted
embedded certain conflicts—such as the scope of minority group
rights and local authority—into the text. Although the Tripoli and
276
See HANNA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES
39–41 (2011) (arguing that incrementalist strategies of constitution-making in
deeply divided societies allow the deferral of controversial choices to future political institutions, which in turn allows the constitution to reflect divided perspectives). Deferral also enables more broad-based participation with regard to fundamental issues, once the societal and political environment improves.
277 IRAQ CONSTITUTION Oct. 15, 2005, art. 49, 112, 122, 140. See generally, Ashley
S. Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq’s Constitution: A Drafting History, 40 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 1 (2007) (discussing and analyzing the drafting history and most significant and controversial provisions of the 2005 constitution).
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Tobruk based governments reached a détente regarding the completion of the draft constitution—minority group members continued
to have reservations about the process and boycotted its final stages.
Public participation in the constitution-making process was severely
limited due to the security concerns.
The Libyan constitution must be adopted by public referendum.278 In order to enhance public support for the constitution, prereferendum and/or post-referendum processes should be developed that provide opportunities for the public and disaffected minority groups to provide input about the constitutional text. These
processes should include negotiations with core constituencies, public referenda, and legislative debate. In order to ensure broad-based
public support for the constitution, the Libyan unity government
should institute a pre-referendum negotiation process to reach consensus with minority group representatives on constitutional provisions that touch upon their concerns, such as cultural and linguistic
protection, local autonomy, and political representation. As minority group representatives boycotted the final stages of the drafting
process, their constituencies are likely to oppose the constitution if
they are not provided with an opportunity to weigh in on textual
provisions that impact them.
If the Libyan unity government is unable to reach consensus
with affected communities on these issues prior to the public referendum, then the public referendum should be coupled with a public
commitment to institute a constitutional amendment process on
provisions that are of concern to minority and local constituencies.
The current draft of the constitution does not allow for constitutional amendment until five years after the constitution has entered
into force.279 If the most contentious issues cannot be resolved in a
pre-referendum process, the draft constitution should be amended
to allow for an immediate amendment process upon completion of
the referendum. The current draft of the constitution allows either
the President, or a third of either legislative chamber to submit a
provision for amendment to both chambers for approval by absolute
majority.280 Following approval, the amendment is submitted to the
public by referendum for approval by an absolute majority of those
voting.281 The goal of either a pre-referendum or post-referendum
278
279
280
281

DRAFT LIBYAN CONST. art. 221, supra note 87.
Id. at art. 217(1).
Id. at art. 217(3)–(4).
Id. at art. 217(6).
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process would be to bring minority and local government advocates
into the constitutional order, so that they do not resort to violent
means to achieve their political aims.
The draft constitution properly defers a number of issues that
involve the distribution of power to a future legislature to resolve.
The resolution of these issues without adequate public debate and
deliberation could undermine reconciliation. This approach was
followed by the Government of Iraq after it adopted a new constitution following years of sectarian division under the brutal dictatorship of Sadaam Hussein.282 In both Iraq and Libya, the constitutional deferral of power sharing arrangements to future legislatures
is an acknowledgement of the long-term nature of reconciliation and
the importance of public engagement in the resolution. For example, the Libyan draft constitution calls for a law to determine the geographic distribution of votes for the Presidency.283 This provision
seeks to ensure that the President is not solely elected by populous
urban centers and that less populous regions have a meaningful say
in the election. This centripetal feature of the constitution is intended to promote moderate non-sectarian candidates for the Office
of the President who will have national rather than merely regional
appeal. How to achieve the appropriate geographic balance is likely
to be the subject of intensive debate as it impacts the proportionate
influence of regions.284 The draft constitution also provides that the
type and competencies of local government units will be determined
by future laws.285 Similarly, any other issues that implicate minority
group rights and local powers that remain unresolved should be deferred to future legislation.
Finally, transitional justice measures must be prioritized. A reconciliation process which addresses the abuses and oppression of
the Qadaffi era, as well as the human rights abuses that occurred
during the civil war, will be critical to ensuring broad based societal
support for the emerging constitutional system. The current draft
282
Darin E.W. Johnson, 2007 In Iraq: The Surge and Benchmarks – A New Way
Forward?, 24 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 249, 253–254 (2008).
283 DRAFT LIBYAN CONST., supra note 87, at art. 111.
284 As discussed in Section 3, the topic of regional influence delayed the initial
appointment of the constituent assembly. There are many models for achieving a
geographic distribution in the election of a president. The United States has opted
for the electoral college, while other states, such as Nigeria, have required that successful candidates receive a minimum threshold of support from all regions, as discussed in Section 5.
285 DRAFT LIBYAN CONST., supra note 87, at art. 155–158.
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constitution calls for transitional justice measures that include the
documentation of human rights violations, compensation, restitution, prosecution, and the passage of laws that ensure that the reconciliation measures are effective, impartial, and reflective of the
various segments of Libyan society.286 The immediate implementation of transitional justice measures will foster reconciliation and address lingering grievances that might serve as a basis for a devolution back into civil war if left unaddressed.
7.2. Yemen
In Yemen, transition planners organized a broadly inclusive participatory process in the form of the National Dialogue Conference,
with the goal that the agreed constitutional arrangements would be
implemented by a constituent assembly. Unfortunately, the National Dialogue did not achieve consensus on an issue that ultimately caused major factions to wage war—the federal structure of
the state. In order for the draft constitution—or an amended draft
constitution—to be viable, the competing governments in Sanaa and
Aden must arrive at a peace settlement that includes a consensus
solution regarding the federal structure of the state and other unresolved issues that threaten national cohesion. A renewal of United
Nations backed peace talks, held from May to August 2016, appears
to be the most viable way ahead for the resolution of issues between
the warring parties.287 The peace negotiations could also serve as a
forum for the resolution of several other structural and political issues important to Yemeni factions that were not resolved in the
NDC or the CDC, such as the devolution of power, balance of powers within the political party system, and transitional justice

Id. at art. 197.
At the time of the writing of this article, the UN-brokered peace talks had
been suspended. Rod Nordland, Talks to End War in Yemen Are Suspended, N.Y.
TIMES, (Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/07/world/middleeast/yemen-peace-talks-cease-fire.html [https://perma.cc/Y8CB-YDZP]; See
Yemeni Peace Talks Enter ‘New Phase,’ as UN Envoy Announces Month-Long Pause for
Consultations,
U.N.
NEWS
CTR.
(Aug.
6,
2016),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54637#.WIkIxFMrLZ4
[https://perma.cc/4W86-M6HR] (discussing the new phase of Yemeni peace talks
that will focus on crystallizing precise technical details among different parties to
the conflict).
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measures.288 Left unresolved, these issues will undermine societal
reconciliation and public support for a new constitution. As part of
a peace deal, the parties must also agree to embed the consensus solutions into the draft constitution and to put it forward for adoption
by public referendum, so that the broader public has an opportunity
to endorse the consensus solutions.289
Regarding the federal structure of the state—Hadi loyalists will
need to reach agreement with the Houthis and Southern Hiraak
Movement regarding the number of regions within the federal system and their boundaries. Although the Southern Hiraak Movement has advocated secession in the past, its leaders are open to federalism in the near term, as their representatives in the NDC
previously supported a two-region federal structure.290 A two region federal structure is not without its problems. The four to one
population imbalance between the North and South would favor the
North in population based representative bodies and could inflame
tensions between Northern elites and Northern minority groups
such as the Houthis, who had been politically marginalized by
Hadi.291 As the Houthis have taken over a swath of the country by
force, they will likely seek a political settlement that protects their
gains in political power. One consociational option for ensuring
Houthi political influence would be to draw a new federal region
comprised primarily of the Houthi homeland, which would guarantee Houthi representation in national governance bodies.292
Complex issues such as determining the specific territorial
boundaries of the federal regions may require more time and detailed negotiations than peace talks may allow; therefore, after
framework agreements are reached during peace talks, a follow-on
independent commission can be charged with resolving these questions.293 The draft constitution also provides that a future legislature
will draft an elections law, regional authority law, judicial authority

Gaston, supra note 139, at 5.
Currently the draft constitution is being held in limbo, as the completion
of the document without a consensus on the federal structure of the state led the
Houthis to take over the capital. In order to capitalize on the work completed by
the constituent assembly, the Houthis’ political commitment to support the draft
constitution must be obtained through negotiations.
290 See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 143, at 13.
291 Ghafarzade, supra note 249, at 1002.
292 Id. at 1003–04.
293 Id. at 1001–05.
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law, constitutional court law, and transitional justice law.294 Deferring these issues to a future legislature appropriately provides the
public with an opportunity, through elected representatives, to have
input on laws that impact the distribution of power and reconciliation in the reconstituted state. To ensure multiethnic and regional
representation, future legislatures can consider centripetal and consociational options in the elections, regional authority and constitutional court laws. Particular emphasis should be given to centripetal
options in electoral laws to encourage the moderation of views
among political representatives. Similarly, the transitional justice
law should be drafted in a manner that ensures impartiality and inclusivity.
8. CONCLUSION
This case study of “conflict constitution-making” in Libya and
Yemen reveals that where a constitution-making process is pursued
during active civil war, armed actors will exploit the constitution
making process and transform it from a zone of conciliation into a
zone of conflict, unless a political agreement is achieved that commits armed actors to a consensual process. Further, remedial
measures must be implemented to increase public support for the
new constitution, citizen engagement in state formation over time,
and the election of moderates committed to maintaining the state.
In the case of Libya, constitution-making processes were stymied by
internal conflict, but a UN brokered political agreement created renewed space for the competing governments to support the constituent assembly and a unified state under the new constitution. Once
the security environment improves, measures can be implemented
to engage the public in the constitution-making process and in the
development of implementing legislation that encourages moderate
political actors. In Yemen, the National Dialogue’s failure to achieve
political consensus with powerful factions on fundamental issues
catalyzed a civil war that undermined the work of constitutional
drafters and threatened the long-term viability of the draft constitution. A peace agreement that commits warring governments to
peace and ends the violent conflict is a predicate to any future progress on constitutional reform. Such progress will be dependent
294

DRAFT YEMEN CONST., supra note 247, at art. 420.
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upon measures that address the political aspirations of the politically powerful Houthi and Southern secessionist groups, and which
commit them and the broader public to supporting a single state
over time. Measures that encourage the multiethnic representation
of moderates at the national level can help to diffuse ethnic and regional divisions over time.
Ultimately, for effective constitution-making to occur, there
must be a state to constitute. Where civil war has destroyed the fabric of the state and created warring de facto states, defined by region
and ethnicity, a peace must be achieved committing the parties to
the creation of one state. That collective commitment to re-constituting the state is made effective through a consensual constitutionmaking process that involves the public and incentivizes continuing
peace and broad public commitment to the newly constituted state
through constitutional design features specifically tailored to mitigate societal divisions.
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